"Boutique" financial advisors vs. full-service investment banks: An analysis of advisor choice and deal outcomes in mergers and acquisitions by Kurkela, Mikko
"Boutique" financial advisors vs. full-service investment
banks: An analysis of advisor choice and deal outcomes
in mergers and acquisitions
Finance
Master's thesis
Mikko Kurkela
2014
Department of Finance
Aalto University
School of Business
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
 Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Abstract of master’s thesis 
 
 
Author  Mikko Kurkela 
Title of thesis  “Boutique” financial advisors vs. full-service investment banks - An analysis of 
advisor choice and deal outcomes in mergers and acquisitions 
Degree  Master of Science in Business Administration 
Degree programme  Finance 
Thesis advisor(s)  Professor Matti Keloharju 
Year of approval  2014 Number of pages  66 Language  English 
Abstract  
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis, I study the motives and impact of hiring boutique advisors in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Specifically, this paper investigates a merging firm’s choice between boutique 
and full-service advisors and the impact of advisor choice on deal outcomes regarding deal 
premium, deal duration and deal completion. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
My sample consists of 906 M&A transactions. The sample is collected from the Securities Data 
Corporations (SDC) database in Thomson One Banker. The sample contains completed and 
withdrawn transactions from the international merger database from 1987 to 2013. Both the 
acquirer and target firm are required to be publicly traded firms from the EU-19 countries, 
Norway, and Switzerland. Advisor choice is analyzed with multivariate logistic regressions. Deal 
premiums are analyzed with OLS regressions and a two-step procedure. Deal duration is analyzed 
with OLS regressions and deal completion is analyzed with multivariate probit regressions. 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The findings suggest that deal size is an important factor in determining how merging firms select 
financial advisors. Boutique advisors are less likely to be chosen by either acquirers or targets as 
deal size increases. Additionally, some findings suggest that boutique advisors are hired when 
merging firms face complex transactions but these findings are weak. With regard to whether 
boutiques can improve deal outcomes, the findings are mixed. 
 
Keywords  mergers and acquisitions, advisor choice, boutique advisor, full-service advisor, deal 
premium, deal duration, deal completion 
 
  
 Tekijä  Mikko Kurkela 
Otsikko  “Putiikki” neuvonantajat v. täyden palvelun investointipankit - Analyysi 
neuvonantajien valinnasta ja näiden vaikutuksesta yrityskauppojen lopputuloksiin 
Tutkinto  Kauppatieteiden maisteri 
Ohjelma  Rahoitus 
Ohjaaja Professori Matti Keloharju 
Hyväksytty 2014 Sivumäärä  66 Kieli  Englanti 
Tiivistelmä  
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkin pro gradu-tutkielmassani yrityskauppojen osapuolten motiiveja palkata 
putiikkineuvonantajia ja putiikkineuvonantajien palkkaamisen vaikutuksia yrityskauppojen 
lopputuloksiin. Tutkimuksessa vertaan putiikkineuvonantajien ja täyden palvelun 
investointipankkien valintaa yrityskauppojen neuvonantajiksi, minkä lisäksi tutkimuksessa 
analysoidaan neuvonantajien vaikutuksia kaupan preemioon, pituuteen, ja loppuun 
saattamiseen.  
 
DATA JA METODOLOGIA 
Otokseni koostuu 906 yrityskaupasta. Otos on lähtöisin Securities Data Corporations (SDC) -
tietokannasta, joka löytyy Thomson One Banker -tietokannasta. Otos sisältää toteutuneita sekä 
peruuntuneita yrityskauppoja vuodesta 1987 vuoteen 2013. Otoksessa sekä ostava että myyvä 
osapuoli ovat julkisia yrityksiä EU-19 maista, Norjasta, ja Sveitsistä. Neuvonantajien valintaan 
vaikuttavia tekijöitä analysoidaan monimuuttujaisilla logistisilla regressioilla. Kaupan preemioita 
analysoidaan OLS-regressioilla ja kahden vaiheen analyysillä. Kaupan pituutta analysoidaan 
OLS-regressioilla, ja kaupan loppuunsaattamista analysoidaan monimuuttujaisilla probit-
regressioilla. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tutkimukseni tulokset viittaavat siihen, että kaupan suuruus on tärkeä tekijä neuvonantajien 
valinnassa. Kaupan koon kasvaessa putiikkineuvonantajan valitseminen on 
epätodennäköisempää kuin täyden palvelun investointipankin valitseminen. Lisäksi eräät 
tulokset viittaavat siihen, että putiikkineuvonantajia palkataan kun yritysostojen osapuolet 
kohtaavat monimutkaisia transaktioita, mutta nämä tulokset ovat heikkoja. Yrityskauppojen 
lopputulosten analyysin tulokset viittaavat siihen, että putiikkineuvonantajilla on kahtalaisia 
vaikutuksia. 
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1. Introduction 
In January 2011 a deal between BP and Rosneft of Russia was announced. The deal included a 
share swap agreement between the companies worth $7.8 billion. BP was advised by five full-
service investment banks – Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, UBS, Credit-Suisse and Renaissance 
Capital, as well as a small “boutique” advisor Lambert Energy Advisory. “Boutique” is the word 
used by the financial advisory industry when referring to independent financial advisors. Lambert 
Energy Advisory, headed by Philip S. O. Lambert, a former investment banker, advised BP on the 
deal with Rosneft to explore the Russian Arctic. Lambert reportedly landed the deal because of 
experience advising companies in the oil and gas industry and his connections in Russia.1 
Lambert Energy Advisory’s involvement is a prime example of a situation when boutique 
advisors are hired by firms to give advice on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Boutique advisors 
often specialize in a certain industry and have deep expertise in M&A. Lambert’s industry- and 
country-specific expertise was something BP felt was needed and consequently the firm was 
included on its advisory team. 
In addition to expertise, independence from other financial services makes boutique 
advisors attractive to clients. Advocates of smaller banks say their focus on M&A allows them to 
provide impartial advice for corporate executives.2 Consequently, firms involved in M&A may 
value independent boutique firms as they are less prone to possible structural conflicts of interest. 
Lazard, a well-known boutique advisor, states on its website that it has a “client-aligned business 
model” and that its “focus on advice and solutions avoids structural conflicts of interest.” Structural 
conflicts of interest are conflicts that arise when an advisor is in a position in which its duties as an 
advisor conflict with other direct or indirect financial interests of the company’s other divisions 
and/or activities.  
                                                 
1 Chazan, G., 2012. BP to sell TNK-BP stake to Rosneft. Financial Times, Online Edition. October 22. 
Wedigier, J., 2011. BP Used Boutique Firm as Adviser on Partnership With Rosneft. Deal Book, The New York Times, 
Online Edition, January 19. 
2Campbell M., Simmons J. & Monks M., 2013. Publicis-Omnicom: Small Banks Rothschild, Moelis Win. 
businessweek.com, August 1. 
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Structural conflicts of interests can materialize as leakage of sensitive or confidential 
information from one client to another through the divisions of a diversified investment bank. Hahn 
(2003) mentions an example of a conflict that can arise in a multidivisional investment bank. In 
her article, she writes that in 2003, Dana Inc. filed a lawsuit against its lender and advisor UBS, 
which at the time was advising Dana on a confidential project. Dana claimed that UBS had used 
confidential information to help its rival in launching a hostile bid for Dana. Dana became aware 
of UBS being an advisor to its rival only after the deal became public when UBS disclosed this 
connection and offered to resign. These kinds of conflicts of interest can be mitigated when using 
independent, boutique advisory firms that do not have diversified business lines, which facilitate 
possibilities for structural conflicts of interest.  
Apart from a few large and well-known boutique advisors such as Lazard and Rothschild, 
which continuously rank high in investment banking industry league tables3, boutique advisors 
tend to be small and are often unable to attract the biggest deals, because of geographical 
limitations, smaller resources, limited lending capacity, and limited services to offer besides 
advisory. Nevertheless, classifying an advisor as boutique by size alone is not an efficient 
classification method. For example, using the number of employees for classification is not feasible 
as employees for a boutique advisor can range from a few employees to several thousand (Lazard 
had 2,513 employees at the end of 20124).  
Subsequently, the differentiation of the biggest M&A boutiques from full-service 
investment banks isn’t always a clear-cut decision. Evercore, a large boutique advisor, describes 
itself as “independent, unencumbered by the potential conflicts of interest inherent in bulge-bracket 
banks and universal banks. We are never in a position where our client's best interests are in conflict 
with our own”. Independence, as Evercore describes it, is vague and open to questioning. 
Independence in investment banking generally indicates being independent of commercial 
banking. For example, Pareto Securities claim that they are an independent full-service investment 
bank with a leading position in the Nordic capital markets5. Additionally, as I defined earlier, 
independence can also be described of being free of conflicts with other divisions. Blackstone, 
another large boutique advisor describes its business by the following: “We are independent 
                                                 
3 See e.g. League Tables – Investment Banking Review – FT.com. Financial Times, Online Edition. 
4 www.lazard.com 
5 www.paretosec.com 
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advisors, providing objective advice, with no underwriting, trading or research conflicts.” What is 
similar with both Evercore and Blackstone is the fact that both specialize in corporate finance 
advisory services. Both companies also have some diversification but little compared e.g. with the 
bulge-bracket investment bank Goldman Sachs, whose business segments include Investment 
banking, Institutional Client Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. Of 
these, M&A advisory sits in the Investment banking segment along with other advisory services. 
 My classification criteria for an advisor to be a boutique are that the company a) specializes 
in corporate finance advisory and b) doesn’t have a large range of diversified business segments, 
which accumulate to the advisor being a full-service investment bank (accordingly, having some 
other line of business such as wealth management doesn’t cause the immediate exclusion from the 
boutique sample). Consequently, the main criteria of inclusion reflect the choice of the strategy of 
the advisor rather than capabilities of advising bigger deals or the size of the advisor. 
This paper sets to examine the motives and impact of hiring boutique advisors in M&A 
transactions. Specifically, I use the methodology of Song et al. (2013) to examine whether their 
research of boutique advisors in the U.S. market holds in a European setting. The paper of Song et 
al. (2013) sets the foundation for my hypotheses and subsequent analyses. The main hypotheses 
are the skill and scale hypotheses. The skill hypothesis states that firms are more likely to hire 
boutique advisors because of their skills or expertise in a particular industry or generally in M&A 
advising. The scale hypothesis states that the biggest M&A deals will be advised by full-service 
banks as they tend to have more resources, larger geographical presence, and diversified services 
as opposed to boutiques, which are small but specialized. These main hypotheses are tested through 
several sub-hypotheses, which are categorized into two groups: hypotheses on advisor choice and 
deal outcomes.  
My analysis is based on manually compiled European data of M&A transactions between 
1987 and 2013. The data has been gathered from the Securities Data Corporations (SDC) database 
in Thomson One Banker and completed with manual data gathered from the websites of the 
advisors in my sample and other relevant, reliable websites6 to classify companies as boutiques or 
full-service investment banks. 
                                                 
6 Such as Bloomberg Businessweek, which has an extensive company profile database. 
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The results of the empirical analysis are two-part. My empirical analysis shows strong 
support for the scale hypothesis. The findings suggest that deal size is an important factor in 
determining how merging firms select financial advisors. Boutique advisors are less likely to be 
chosen by either acquirers or targets as deal size increases (compared with full-service investment 
banks). However, the empirical analysis shows some, but generally weak or mixed evidence for 
the skill hypothesis.  
Correspondingly, the tests on the sub-hypotheses for the advisor choice category show 
some support that boutiques are hired when the acquirer is facing a complex transaction, but this 
evidence is not as strong as in the article by Song et al. (2013). The significant results I find are 
mostly limited to sub-samples and are not consistent throughout the different analyses. 
Nonetheless, the significant results that I do find indicate that boutiques are hired when companies 
face complex deals. The results suggest that boutiques are hired by acquirers when the target is 
from another industry, which can be attributed to the industry specific expertise commonly credited 
to boutique advisors7. In addition, my results show that in mergers, boutique advisors are hired by 
acquirers when the deal is hostile and when the deal is financed with stock. Acquirers hire boutique 
advisors as part of a mixed group of boutiques and investment banks (mixed teams) when there is 
competition for the target and when the form of payment is stock. On the target side, boutiques are 
hired as part of mixed teams when the acquirer is considered hostile and when the acquirer uses 
stock as a form of payment.  
The empirical findings of the analysis of deal outcomes provide mixed evidence for the 
skill hypothesis. For deal premiums, I find that the choice of boutique advisors by acquirers 
decreases premiums, but boutiques are not able to decrease premiums relative to other Tier 2 
advisors. Mixed teams are able to increase deal premiums on the target side, while Tier 2 boutiques 
are able to increase premiums relative to other Tier 2 advisors. Additionally, the results for deal 
outcome analyses with regard to deal duration and deal completion give inconclusive evidence for 
the skill hypothesis. 
The contribution of my study to existing empirical M&A literature is the further testing of 
the two main hypotheses originally developed and tested by Song et al. (2013). While their research 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Dealbook, 2009. Boutiques Grab M&A Market Share From Big Firms. Deal Book, The New York Times, 
Online Edition, September 25.  
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is based on a U.S. sample of domestic M&A deals, my research is based on a sample of European 
M&A deals across 21 countries. Thus my research studies the European advisory market and can 
be used for comparison to the U.S. study. My analysis shows some similar results such as strong 
support for the scale hypothesis. However, my analysis doesn’t find as strong support for the skill 
hypotheses as the paper of Song et al. (2013). This is partly due to the limitation of my sample size, 
which is around half of the size of the original article. Another limitation is that the classification 
of advisors is subjective. No standard, universally accepted classification criteria are available for 
determining whether a firm providing investment banking services including advisory are boutique 
or full-service investment banks. Nonetheless, I use the same methodology and classification 
criteria as Song et al. (2013) and my results are similar so these two papers provide one way to find 
similar results. 
An interesting feature of advisory services left out of this paper is the pricing of advisory 
services and the differences of pricing between different types of advisors. Understanding the 
relation between skills, fees, and the economies of scale of advisors is a possible topic for future 
literature. Song et al. (2013) state that boutique advisors are more likely to charge lower fees than 
full-service advisors, which means they could be a cheaper alternative for M&A transactions. They 
support this with evidence from Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) who find that acquirers pay larger fees 
when they use top-tier advisors8. In addition, they find that the average fee charged by full-service 
advisors to acquirer (target) firms in our sample is $6.14 million ($7.22 million), compared with 
the $2.55 million ($2.7 million) charged by boutique advisors. However, as fees are based on the 
size of the deal, the average fees are not a reliable benchmark. Nonetheless, it is implausible to 
expect that boutique advisors would be able to provide better expertise and thus produce better 
outcomes, and also be the cheapest alternative in the market. Unfortunately, fees are given by SDC 
for only a handful of the deals in my sample of European M&A transactions and analyses related 
to fees are thus left outside the scope of this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review existing literature on M&A 
advisory. Section 3 covers my hypotheses and their testable empirical implications. Section 4 
                                                 
8 Advisors ranked by the dollar value of transactions and number of transactions handled by the advisor. 
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describes the sources and processing of data, Section 5presents the empirical findings, and Section 
6 contains discussions about the results. My conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. M&A characteristics and trends  
Empirical research on M&A until the 21st century focused on event studies.  These studies 
often showed that mergers create shareholder value with most of the gains accruing to the target 
company. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) examine literature on the market for corporate 
control from 1977 to 1983 and report that targets of successful tender offers and mergers earn 
significantly positive abnormal returns on announcement and through the completion of the offers. 
They also report positive returns to successful bidders in tender offers but observe that returns to 
successful bidders in mergers are zero. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) confirm the findings with a 
considerably larger empirical study.  
Andrade et al. (2000) summarize and expand these aforementioned studies by analyzing 
the immediate stock market response to more than 4000 mergers completed from 1973 to 1998. 
They defend the traditional view that mergers improve efficiency and that gains to shareholders 
after the merger announcement accurately reflect improved expectations of future cash flows. They 
conclude that it is actually difficult to say what the abnormal returns for acquiring firms should be. 
They argue that mergers are comparable to any other investment decision (research and 
development, capital expenditures, joint ventures, and so on), which according to other empirical 
studies have shown abnormal announcement returns of less than one percent (McConnell & 
Mustarella, 1985 and Martin & Kensinger, 1990).  
More recent M&A literature has also focused on some issues of why mergers occur by 
building up from the two most consistent empirical features of merger activity during the last 
century: 1) mergers occur in waves and 2) within a wave, mergers strongly cluster by industry 
(Andrade et al. 2001). Mitchell & Mulherin (1996), whose paper studies the takeover wave of the 
1980s, find that half of the takeovers and restructurings in an industry take place in one-fourth of 
the sample period, suggesting that common factors influence the takeovers occurring in an industry. 
They also find evidence indicating links between industry shocks and subsequent takeover and 
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restructuring activity. This clustering of mergers by public firms in time and industry is also 
confirmed by other studies (Andrade et al., 2001, and Harford, 2005). However, Netter et al. (2011) 
utilize a substantially larger sample of M&As than those found in previous studies and find that 
the patterns of merger waves found in earlier research are significantly smoothed out when private 
acquirers and small deals are included. This is confirmed by Maksimovic et al. (2013) who find 
that public firms purchase and sell assets at a higher intensity than private firms. To a large extent, 
the observed M&A waves are driven by the higher participation of public firms. 
There are two main explanations to why mergers would occur in waves. The neoclassical 
model argues that industries responding to shocks reorganize through mergers and acquisitions.  
The behavioral model derives from Shleifer & Vishny (2003). They present a model of stock-
market-driven acquisitions, which implies that mergers are driven by misvaluation in financial 
markets. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) present a similar theory and Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) empirically test and find support for misvaluation theories based either on behavioral 
explanations or asymmetric information between otherwise rational managers and markets. 
Harford (2005) tests both the behavioral and the neoclassical model and concludes that shocks, be 
they economic, regulatory, or technological, cause industry merger waves, but only if sufficient 
capital liquidity is present to accommodate the necessary transactions. He notes that while it would 
be untruthful to claim that there are no mergers driven by managers timing the market, such mergers 
are not the cause of waves. Rather, aggregate merger waves are caused by the clustering of shock-
driven industry merger waves, not by attempts to time the market.  
2.2. Financial advisors in M&A 
M&A is one of the most important activities in corporate finance, bringing about 
considerable reallocations of resources within the economy. Therefore it is not surprising that 
financial advisors, being significant players in the market for corporate controls, have received a 
lot of attention in financial literature. 
Empirical literature on M&A advisors in the early 1990s focused on advisory fees 
(McLaughlin, 1990), the relationship between dollar gains in acquisitions and banker prestige 
(Bowers and Miller, 1990), and the relationship between advisory fees and merger gains (Hunter 
and Walker 1990). McLaughlin (1990), one of the first to empirically measure investment banking 
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advisory fees in tender offers, describes the role of investment bankers in M&A as controversial 
because of the compensation they allegedly receive and the potential conflicts of interest between 
the bankers and their clients. He finds that despite sensational offers and fees reported in the 
business press, investment banking advisory fees were on average only 1.29% of the value of 
completed transactions. However, the investment banking fees in 95% of the contracts with bidding 
firms increase if the takeover is successful. This type of contract design can lead to investment 
banks suggesting higher premiums to the bidder to get the deal done. 
2.3. Advisor effects on deal outcomes 
2.3.1. Deal premiums and excess returns 
McLaughlin (1992) expands the previously mentioned study on banker fees and finds 
significant effects associated with banker reputation9. Specifically, his results show that bidders 
with low-reputation investment advisors offer substantially lower premiums and that bidders with 
lower-reputation bankers also experience significantly higher excess returns around the 
announcement. Consequently, bidders with lower-reputation bankers bid less and experience better 
returns than bidders with high-reputation bankers. McLaughlin (1992) concludes that the results 
are consistent with at least two interpretations. Either high-reputation bankers are encouraging their 
bidding firm clients to higher bids with a corresponding reduction in firm value, or high-reputation 
advisors are associated with more difficult transactions, requiring higher premiums and with lower 
benefits to bidding firms. 
The results of McLaughlin (1992) are consistent with the controversy between theory and 
the empirical findings in literature on M&A advisors. Leaders in the M&A advisory industry are 
the same players that dominate the whole investment banking industry. These so-called “bulge-
bracket” firms are top-tier investment banks that have built up a reputation as experts in financial 
transactions. This reputational advantage is accompanied by premium fees that should theoretically 
ensure that bulge-bracket advisors perform superior services for their clients (Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri, 1994).  
                                                 
9 Ranked by the methodology of Carter & Manaster (1990) who use tombstone announcements, which are listings of 
pending public security offerings, in which investment bankers are listed in sections, and these are in order of prestige. 
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Nonetheless, most empirical research fails to support this theoretical framework. Bowers 
and Miller (1990) show that top-tier advisors10 can identify deals with higher total synergies, but 
are not able to provide a bargaining advantage to capture a larger share of these synergies. On the 
other hand, Michel et al. (1991) present results that differ from those of Bowers and Miller. By 
determining the cumulative abnormal returns of target firms, they find that clients of a less 
prestigious advisor, Drexel Burnham Lambert, outperformed other investment bankers in the 
sample in providing acquisition bid advice to the client firm. 
Many studies that examine the relation between abnormal returns and advisor reputation 
(proxied by market share) have reported either a negative or at best an insignificant relationship 
between the reputation of the bidder’s advisor and bidder returns. For example, Rau (2000) 
develops and tests a hypothesis, which argues that acquirers in mergers and tender offers advised 
by top-tier investment banks (with a high market share) should earn higher announcement-period 
excess returns on average than acquirers advised by lower-tier investment banks. He finds that 
bidders in mergers advised by first-tier investment banks earn significantly lower announcement 
abnormal returns than do bidders advised by either second- or third-tier banks. However, his 
findings also suggest that in tender offers, bidders advised by first-tier banks earn significantly 
higher abnormal returns in the announcement period than bidders in deals advised by either second- 
or third-tier bank. Rau (2000) also finds evidence consistent with McLaughlin (1992), which 
suggests that acquiring firms using low-quality investment bankers offer significantly lower 
premiums than high-reputation investment banks. 
Consistent with this, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) find that the post-merger gains realized by 
the acquiring firms in mergers decline when first-tier advisors are employed. Interestingly, they 
find that larger total advisory fees paid are associated with larger post-merger gains and that when 
acquirers switch their financial advisors within the same tier, switching is associated with larger 
post-merger gains to acquiring firms.  
Servaes and Zenner, (1996) have similar results when comparing acquisitions advised by 
investment banks with those that are executed by in-house staff. They find that the announcement 
excess returns earned by the acquirers do not depend on whether an investment bank is used.  For 
                                                 
10 Defined as the bulge-bracket at that time including The First Boston Corporation, Goldman, Sachs & Company, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley & Company and Salomon Brothers. 
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takeovers, they also examine whether the use of investment bank advice affects the premium paid 
by acquirers for targets, but they find no significant effect. 
Yet Kale et al. (2003) document that when the client firm (bidder or target) employs a more 
reputable financial advisor, it enjoys a greater absolute wealth gain as well as a larger share of the 
total wealth created in a successful takeover. The writers argue that one reason why previous 
studies do not document a significant role for advisor reputation may be their failure to control for 
the reputation of the opponent's advisor or that the reputations of the advisors chosen by the target 
and the bidder are entered separately (instead of a measure of relative financial advisor reputation11) 
into the analysis, and because of the adversarial nature of the takeover process, the separately 
entered advisor reputation variables do not exhibit significant relations. 
Market share is not the only measure of reputation used in financial literature. Bao & 
Edmans (2011) use the past performance of investment banks to measure reputation. They find that 
certain banks have ability in identifying good acquisitions and negotiating terms, or trustworthiness 
in turning down bad deals.  
Golubov et al. (2012) argue that reputation is not equally important in all transactions and 
that advisor reputation is relatively more important in the acquisitions of public firms. Their 
empirical evidence shows that top-tier advisors (measured by the value of the deals they advise on) 
are associated with higher bidder gains in public acquisitions, but not in private or subsidiary deals. 
They note that public acquisitions require more skill and effort on the part of the advisors, because 
public targets have more power and are able to capture most of the gains, public deals increase 
disclosure liabilities and other governance issues, and public firms have dispersed ownership, 
which makes indemnification from the seller practically impossible. 
As shown, most literature examines the impact of different tiered advisors (measured by 
reputation) on deal outcomes and little research has been done on other classifications of advisors. 
Song et al. (2013) find that transactions with boutique advisors on the acquirer side result in 
significantly lower premiums paid for the target. After controlling for the advisor's reputation, they 
                                                 
11 Kale et al. (2003) hypothesize that a client that employs a higher reputation advisor will receive a larger share of the 
total synergistic gains from the takeover. However, whether the client has a strategic advantage depends on the 
reputation of its advisor relative to the reputation of the advisor to the opposing side and not on the absolute reputation 
of the advisor. 
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estimate that the premiums paid to targets are, on average, 8–10% lower for mergers when 
acquirers hire boutique advisors, compared with deals where full-service advisors are used. Target 
shareholders in tender offers receive significantly higher premiums (about 17% higher) when 
boutique advisors are hired by target management. These findings provide some evidence for the 
superior performance of boutique advisors in terms of deal pricing. 
2.3.2. Deal duration and deal completion 
Rau (2000) develops and tests a hypothesis that states that the valuation of the deal is of 
secondary importance. Because investment banks advising acquirers in mergers and tender offers 
face strong deal completion incentives in their fee structure, their role is simply to complete the 
deal, in which case the market share of the investment bank will depend on the number of deals it 
completes. He shows that the market shares of investment banks in both mergers and tender offers 
are positively related to their ability to complete the deal. Though investment banks have some 
incentives in mergers to complete the deal, these incentives do not necessarily result in value-
destroying deals for acquirers. In tender offers, however, there is strong evidence that the market 
share of an investment bank is related to its ability to complete a deal, irrespective of whether the 
deal actually adds value to the acquirer.  
Consistent with this, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) find that advisor quality and the number 
of advisors employed in a given transaction are important in determining the probability of 
completing a deal. Their analyses suggest that top-tier (Tier 1) advisors are more capable of 
completing deals relative to Tier 2 and Tier 3 advisors. Relating to deal duration, they find that 
Tier 1 advisors were found to be more efficient in terms of the amount of time required to complete 
deals, other things equal. On the contrary, Golubov et al. (2012) find limited evidence that top-tier 
advisors are associated with higher deal completion rates. However, they also find evidence that 
deals advised by top-tier investment banks take less time from announcement to completion. 
Song et al. (2013) find that it takes longer to complete a deal when boutique advisors are 
used on the acquirer side, which they attribute to deals being more complex and requiring more 
due diligence, negotiation, and time to complete. Regarding deal completion, they find no 
significant difference in deal success rates between full-service banks and boutique advisors on the 
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acquirer side, but slightly higher deal completion rates when target firms are advised by boutique 
advisors. 
2.4. Determinants of advisor choice 
An increasing amount of literature on M&A transactions examines how merging firms 
choose financial advisors. Servaes & Zenner (1996) study advisor choice as well as the previously 
mentioned wealth effects. They find that transaction costs, contracting costs and information 
asymmetries are related to the investment banking choice. Consequently, firms choose investment 
banks when the acquisition is more complex (they define complexity as hostile takeovers, 
acquisitions that involve a bidding contest, acquisitions paid with securities, and large 
transactions). Firms also choose investment banks when they have less prior acquisition experience 
and when the acquisition involves the takeover of another company. They also find that acquiring 
firms are more likely to use an investment bank when the target operates in many different 
industries, and that acquiring firms are more likely to use an investment bank when they purchase 
publicly traded companies instead of the assets of other firms and when they have lower insider 
ownership. When comparing the choice between first-tier and second-tier investment banks, the 
findings support that first-tier banks are used in complex transactions rather than second-tier 
investment banks. 
Kale et al. (2003) like Servaes & Zenner find that the bidder is more likely to use a financial 
advisor when the bid is hostile and the bidder has less acquisition experience. They find that the 
likelihood that the target will retain a financial advisor is positively related to the strategic 
complexity of the deal and to the size of both the target and the bidder. These findings on hostility 
(bidder) and strategic complexity (target) suggest that firms hire financial advisors not only to 
minimize the transaction costs associated with larger deals but also to obtain strategic advice. 
Chang et al. (2010) study the choice of advisors in M&As at the individual bank level. The 
authors show that industry expertise is a strong determinant of advisor choice, and the effect is 
stronger when the merger is a horizontal one and when the transaction is more complicated. They 
also find that the industry expertise of an investment bank heightens its clients’ concern about 
information leakage to rivals and they avoid sharing advisors with their rivals. 
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Golubov et al. (2012) show that top-tier advisors are hired by larger firms with higher book-
to-market ratios and idiosyncratic volatility but lower preannouncement stock-price run-ups. Top-
tier advisors are also preferred by bidders when acquiring relatively larger targets. 
Song et al. (2013) focus on fundamental characteristics of financial advisors such as 
advisory focus, industry expertise and independence to distinguish boutique advisors from full-
service banks. They find evidence that the use of boutique advisors is more likely when the deal is 
small, or when it is complex (measured by the hostility of the transaction or when it is a stock 
transaction as opposed to a pure cash offer). Additionally, the results show that boutique banks' 
specialized knowledge of certain industries is notable in deals advised by a team comprised of full-
service advisors and boutique advisors. 
3. Hypotheses and testable empirical implications 
In this section, I will present the two main hypotheses, which are the skill and the scale hypotheses. 
After this, the hypotheses are divided into sub-hypotheses based on two different categories: sub-
hypotheses related to advisor choice and deal outcomes. 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Song et al. (2013) base their empirical research on two hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
states that merging firms are more likely to hire boutique advisors because of their skills or 
expertise in a particular industry or generally in M&A advising. This is referred to as the skill 
hypothesis. The skill hypothesis suggests that boutique firms, given their skills, expertise, and 
independence, are more likely to be hired when a firm is facing a complex transaction. 
H1: Boutique advisors are chosen because they have more expertise and skills than full-
service advisors in M&A. 
Second, the larger the deal size, the more likely it will be advised by a full-service 
investment bank. This is because larger deals require scale capabilities. Full-service banks will 
more likely be hired as they tend to have more resources, higher lending capacity, larger 
geographical presence, and diversified services as opposed to boutiques, which are small but 
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specialized. Additionally, full-service investment banks may choose not to take on smaller deals 
of smaller firms as they will not provide sufficient fee income. 
H2: Full-service advisors are chosen for their capabilities and resources to execute and 
advise large deals. 
As the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, there is a possibility of potential co-
existence of the two hypotheses. Song et al. (2013) infer that if some firms choose boutique firms 
for their expertise, while others hire boutique advisors because of the lack of alternatives, the effect 
of expertise on deal performance in a multivariate analysis would be diluted and the statistical 
significance would not be easily detected. Thus, the potential co-existence of both hypotheses 
creates bias against finding empirical support for the skill hypothesis. Finding significant effects of 
expertise on deal outcomes provides convincing evidence in support of the skill hypothesis. 
3.1. Empirical implications on advisor choice 
The scale hypothesis argues that the larger the deal size, the more likely it will be advised 
by a full-service investment bank. Therefore it is fairly straightforward to test empirically. The sub-
hypothesis for the scale hypothesis related to advisor choice is as follows: 
H2.1: Full-service investment banks are more likely to be chosen by the acquirer and target 
for larger deals. 
The skill hypothesis requires more extensive examination. To empirically test whether skill 
is a key reason to hire boutique advisors in M&A transactions, I examine whether boutique firms 
are chosen when merging parties face complex deals. Servaes and Zenner (1996) compare in-house 
acquisitions and the use of investment banks in acquisitions. They find that using investment banks 
is related to the complexity of the transaction. In their study, deal complexity is measured by the 
target managers’ hostility toward the deal, industry relatedness, and the existence of competing 
bids. Song et al. (2013) use these same complexity measures for their study to examine whether 
these are the reasons why boutique advisors are used. They add that the use of stock as payment 
can make the transaction more complex as it makes the offer harder to value for a target firm. In 
addition to these criteria, I hypothesize that cross-border mergers increase complexity in terms of 
identifying suitable targets, valuation and negotiating favorable terms. Accordingly, I use the 
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following sub-hypotheses to define the testable empirical implications for testing the skill 
hypothesis: 
H1.1: Acquirers and targets are more likely to hire boutique advisors or mixed teams in 
hostile deals. 
Hostile deals are more complex for acquirers as they face reluctant management, who will 
also want to hire boutique advisors because of their expertise in M&A deals and defense strategies. 
H1.2: Acquirers are more likely to hire boutique advisors or mixed teams when there is a 
competing bid. 
Competition increases the negotiating power of the target. As the acquirer will want the 
transaction cost to be lower than the value of the company with synergies included, the acquirer 
will require excellent negotiation and valuation skills from the advisor. Servaes & Jenner (1996) 
write that when the firm is not the first bidder, it is more important to react faster, thereby increasing 
the need for investment bank advice compared with in-house acquisitions. The same can be applied 
here: when there is a bid already on the table, it will require more negotiation skills and market 
knowledge to be able to beat the competition.  
H1.3: Acquirers are more likely to hire boutique advisors or mixed teams in cross-industry 
deals. 
Servaes & Jenner (1996) hypothesize that the need for investment bank advice is greater 
when the information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target is larger. They expect a 
greater need for investment bank advice when the acquirer and the target do not operate in the same 
industry. They add that when a firm considers a target in a related industry, the firm can rely on its 
capital budgeting expertise to value the target (in-house acquisition). I hypothesize that boutique 
advisors are more likely to be used for cross-industry M&A than full-service investment banks. 
Boutique firms often specialize in certain industries and have industry-specific knowledge, which 
the acquirer wishes to utilize.  
H1.4: Acquiring and target firms are more likely to hire boutique advisors or mixed teams 
when the payment is in shares of the acquiring firm. 
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Targets will require skilled advisors for acquisitions in which the form of payment is the 
shares of the acquirer. Cash acquisitions are simple in terms of valuation. However, transactions 
paid with securities (or a mix of cash and securities), require more expertise in valuation. When 
target shareholders are offered shares of the acquirer's stock instead of pure cash payment, 
asymmetric information problems are more severe. Therefore, it is more difficult for the target to 
accurately evaluate the offer. 
In addition, acquiring firms may also hire boutique firms when the form of payment is 
stock. This is because from the acquiring firm’s perspective, stock-financed mergers can be viewed 
as two simultaneous transactions: a merger and equity issue (Andrade et al., 2002). Acquirers may 
also choose boutiques for stock-for-stock acquisitions as funding might not be required, playing to 
boutiques’ advantage. 
H1.5: Acquirers are more likely to hire boutique advisors or mixed teams in cross-border 
deals. 
As my sample is gathered from a total of 21 countries, many deals are cross-border 
transactions. In addition to the hypotheses in earlier empirical research on advisor choice and 
complexity, I hypothesize that cross-border deals increase complexity. For example, if the level of 
accounting quality in a country is low, the complexity and potential for error in the valuation of 
companies may increase (Danbolt & Maciver, 2012). 
3.2. Empirical implications on deal outcome 
As previously stated, boutique advisors are generally independent, often specialize in a 
certain industry and have expertise in M&A. The skill hypothesis implies that if boutique advisors 
are better at identifying targets, evaluating deals, and negotiating deals, they should be able to 
improve deal outcomes. 
Boutique advisors on both sides of the transaction can have an impact on deal pricing 
through identifying sources of value e.g. the better valuation of the opposite side or the negotiation 
of better deal terms. Acquiring firms want the price to be as low as possible and therefore boutique 
advisors should be negatively associated with deal premiums. The opposite applies for boutique 
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advisors on the target side. Consequently, the sub-hypothesis for the skill hypothesis with regard 
to deal premiums is as follows: 
H1.6: Boutique advisors or mixed teams decrease (increase) premiums for acquiring 
(target) firms. 
Following the hypotheses on advisor choice, boutique advisors that advise parties in 
complex deals should also be associated with longer deal durations. Complex deals require 
thorough evaluation and due diligence. Therefore boutique advisors or mixed teams on either side 
of the transaction should be associated with a longer time to complete the deal.  
H1.7: Boutique advisors or mixed teams increase deal durations for acquiring and target 
firms. 
 Some previous empirical research shows that top-tier advisors are actually able to complete 
deals faster relative to other tier advisors. This implies that top-tier advisors are more efficient in 
completing the deal. However, whether this is related to skill or other factors is inconclusive. As a 
result, I do not change my view on the hypothesis as it is in line with the other hypotheses related 
to complex deals. 
Deal completion is tougher to hypothesize. On one hand, it could be thought of as a skill, 
if a certain type of advisor would be more likely to be able to complete a deal. On the other hand, 
if boutique advisors face more complex deals (such as hostile deals), it wouldn’t be reasonable to 
expect them to be more likely to complete deals. Consequently, I hypothesize that boutique and 
mixed advisors have no significant impact on deal completion. 
H1.8: Boutique and mixed advisors have no significant impact on deal completion on 
neither the target nor the acquirer side. 
The empirical literature in the previous section gives mixed findings relating to deal 
completion with some studies showing that top-tier advisors are more capable of completing deals 
and some showing no significance. Completion is also related to fee structures as pointed out by 
Rau (2000). Investment banks advising acquirers in mergers and tender offers may face strong deal 
completion incentives in their fee structure, in which case the market share of the investment bank 
will depend on the number of deals it completes. This may be true and can apply for boutiques as 
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well. However, compared with a multidivisional full-service investment bank, I assume boutiques 
will not have the same organizational performance measures and pressure deriving from as the 
M&A team/unit in a full-service investment bank. Additionally, I hypothesize that boutiques would 
not aim for completing a deal, irrespective of whether the deal actually adds value to the acquirer, 
because the boutique advisors focus on M&A advisory and value destroying deals would hurt the 
future business of the boutique. Whilst it would be unrealistic to claim that this wouldn’t be true 
for full-service investment banks, the organizational performance measures may force investment 
banks to pressure deals to go through and the diversified business lines of full-service banks 
mitigate the risks of having an unsatisfied customer in one business. As a result, I do not change 
my view on the hypothesis as it is in line with the other hypotheses related to complex deals. 
I follow Song et al. (2013) and argue that the scale hypothesis does not have clear 
implications for deal outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the empirical implications on the choice of 
advisors and their impact on deal outcomes by the skill and scale hypotheses. 
 
Table 1- Testable empirical implications  
This table summarizes the testable empirical implications of the skill and the scale hypotheses. Panel A presents the empirical 
implications of two hypotheses for the choice of advisors in different types of deals. Panel B presents the empirical implications 
of the skill hypothesis for the impact of boutique advisors on deal outcomes. The scale hypothesis does not have clear implications 
regarding the impact of advisor choices on deal outcomes. 
Panel A. Implications on the choices of advisors    
 Skill hypothesis  Scale hypothesis 
  Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
Hostile deals Boutique or mixed Boutique or mixed - - 
Deals with competing bids Boutique or mixed - - - 
Deals with stock offer Boutique or mixed Boutique or mixed - - 
Cross industry deals Boutique or mixed - - - 
Cross Border deals Boutique or mixed  - - 
Large deals - - Full service Full service 
     
Panel B. Implications on deal outcomes       
  Acquirers use boutique or mixed teams 
Targets use boutique or mixed 
teams 
Deal premium Decrease Increase 
Deal duration Longer Longer 
Deal completion No impact No impact 
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1. Data collection and sample construction 
The sample of M&A transactions is collected from the Securities Data Corporations (SDC) 
database in Thomson One Banker. The sample contains completed and withdrawn transactions 
from the international merger database between December 11, 1987 (the announcement date of the 
first deal in my sample), and August 20, 2013 (the announcement date of the last deal in my 
sample). Both the acquirer and target firm are required to be publicly traded firms from the EU-19 
countries12, Norway, and Switzerland. I include only acquisitions in which the acquiring firm 
controls less than 50% of the target firm before the acquisition announcement and the deal value is 
at least $5 million. Deals that have a premium of more than 200% or less than -50% are 
excluded.13,14 
To classify advisors as boutique or full-service I follow Song et al. (2013) and identify the 
advisors’ business strategy from their websites. Advisors are classified as boutique or full-service 
based on the business strategy of the advisor instead of the size of the firm, for instance. 
Specifically, boutique advisors should be independent and specialized in M&A as opposed to 
having full-spectrum or diversified business lines such as sales and trading, lending and banking, 
asset management, and so on. Consequently, my classification criteria for an advisor to be a 
boutique are that the company a) specializes in corporate finance advisory and b) doesn’t have a 
large range of diversified business segments that accumulate to it being a full-service investment 
bank. The classification is not always clear as some larger boutique banks have other functions and 
in these cases it is important to distinguish the main focus of the business strategy for ensuring 
these advisors are independent of a diverse set of business lines that could cause structural conflicts 
of interest. Accordingly, having some other line of business such as wealth management doesn’t 
cause the immediate exclusion from the boutique sample.  It is also important to note that due to 
cross-border differences, some boutique banks can be major advisors in some countries while being 
minor in other. However, as the classification criteria are strategy and focus related, cross-border 
                                                 
12 EU-19 area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland,  Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom 
13 The specific methodology for measuring deal premium is described in the empirical results section later. 
14 Corporate finance literature also uses winsorizing for dealing with outliers, but here I choose to replicate the 
methodology of Song et al. 2013. The methodology is derived from Officer (2003). 
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differences in terms of classification are not taken into account. In unclear cases, I use news 
websites to determine the industry consensus of the advisor. As there is no well-established 
definition or standard industry classification for a boutique advisor, classifying advisors as 
boutiques or full-service investment banks can be difficult. To mitigate potential bias that can occur 
because of misclassification, I exclude deals where information on financial advisors is insufficient 
or too ambiguous to make a classification.  
There are a total of 425 advisors with unique names given by SDC in the sample. Among 
them, 91 are classified as boutique advisors and the rest as full-service advisors. All deals should 
therefore have at least one advisor on each side, which is clearly classified as a boutique or a full-
service advisor. If a deal is advised by both full-service and boutique advisor(s), I classify the 
advisors as a mixed team. Some deals have advisors, which are not full-service or boutique such 
as accountancy firms including the Big Four accountancy firms. I exclude deals in which these 
accountancies act as a lone advisor as they do not fit into the boutique or full-service investment 
bank category. In transactions, in which these accountancies are a part of a team of advisors, I keep 
them in the sample.15 
Table 2 summarizes the types of financial advisors for the 906 transactions in the sample. 
The transactions are presented as the full sample as well as a merger and a tender offer sub-sample 
consistent with the methodology of Song et al. (2013). There are 573 tender offers and 333 mergers. 
I utilize the tender flag in SDC to identify the sub-samples.16 Boutique advisors are used in 124 
(13.69%) of the transactions by acquiring firms, which illustrates that full-service investment banks 
are dominant in the European M&A advisory market. There are 142 deals (15.67%) that are advised 
by a team of full-service investment banks and boutique advisors. This gives a total of 266 deals 
(29.36%) that have a boutique advisor on the acquiring side. An approximately equal number of 
firms choose boutique advisors on the target side with the participation being a total of 31.13%. 
Figure 1 illustrates the usage of boutique advisors throughout the sample. Consistent with the 
results in Table 2, the target and acquirer side have a similar trend for the use of boutique advisors. 
Apart from larger differences that occur in the earlier and later years of my sample, which are a 
                                                 
15 One focus for future studies could be to test the differences between accountancies, such as the Big 4, and other 
advisors in M&A. 
16 This identification proceeds as follows: If the tender flag is “no” and the deal form is a merger, then the deal is a 
merger. If the tender flag is “yes”, then it is a tender offer. 
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result of smaller sample sizes for those years, the use of boutiques on both sides ranges on average 
from 20-40% yearly. 
Table 2 - Boutique and full-service banks in M&A transactions 
This table presents the use of two types of financial advisors, boutique and full-service banks, as well as a mixture of both, in 
M&A transactions announced during 1987-2013. I also split the whole sample into merger and tender offer sub-samples. 
Information on financial advisors is obtained from SDC's M&A database. The type of advisor is manually identified by searching 
the Websites of advisors. 
 Full Sample  Merger sub-sample  Tender offer sub-sample 
 (N = 906)  (N = 333)  (N = 573) 
 
Acquiring 
firm  
Target 
Firm  
Acquiring 
firm  
Target 
Firm  
Acquiring 
firm  
Target 
Firm 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Type of 
advisors 
                      
Full-service 640  624  230  230  410  394 
 70.64 %  68.87 %  69.07 %  69.07 %  71.55 %  68.76 % 
Boutique 124  121  44  30  80  91 
 13.69 %  13.36 %  13.21 %  9.01 %  13.96 %  14.49 % 
Mixed team 142  161  59  73  83  88 
  15.67 %   17.77 %   17.72 %   21.92 %   14.49 %   15.36 % 
 
Figure 1 - The Time trend of the use of boutique advisors in M&A 
 
Figure 1 shows the pattern that has been found in M&A literature that was discussed in 
section 2. The M&A transactions in my sample occur in waves, or booms, with two booms being 
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present in my sample. The first can be found in 1999-2000 during which the dot-com bubble 
reached its peak. After the collapse of the bubble occurred, the M&A activity slowed down. In 
2005-2007, it reached a new boom until the most recent financial crisis has decreased the number 
of transactions. Although different time cycles would be of interest to cover in theory, the number 
of transactions in my sample limits analyses of smaller samples. Consequently, I leave cyclical 
analyses out of the scope of my research. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports firm and transaction statistics by advisor type for acquiring and target firms 
respectively. As in the study by Song et al. (2013), the choice of boutique advisors is significantly 
related to the deal size and the size of the acquirer. Large deals tend to be advised by full-service 
advisors while smaller deals are more likely to be advised by boutique advisors. Deals advised by 
a mixed team of boutique and full-service advisors are much larger on average than both full-
service and boutiques. For example, mixed teams on the acquirer side have an average deal size of 
$7,014.07 million while the average value of deals advised by full-service investment banks is 
$2,663.80 million. For boutiques, the average value is $792.29 million.  
 The average size of the acquirer measured by the total assets follows the same pattern as 
the transaction value with the biggest acquiring firms using mixed teams ($75,072.26 million for 
acquirers using mixed teams and $101,819.30 million for targets using mixed teams) and the 
smallest acquirers using boutiques ($15,534.0 million for acquirers using boutiques and $22,896.8 
million for targets). 
 The average, relative size (acquirer total assets over target total assets) is highest for deals 
advised by boutiques on both the acquirer and target side. This implies that boutique advisors are 
employed by an acquirer when it is buying a smaller firm or by the target when it is being acquired 
by a larger firm. Mixed teams have the smallest average, relative size on the acquirer side with the 
statistic for acquirer mixed advisors being only 5.97 consistent with the findings of Song et al. 
(2013) that a deal advised by a mixed team is more likely to be a merger of equals than deals 
advised by boutiques or full-service investment banks alone. However, this applies to acquirers 
only as the average, relative size on the target side for mixed teams is 40.16. 
23 
 
 The percentage of deals advised by boutiques and full-service advisors, which are tender 
offers, are similar (64.06 % vs. 64.52 %) while mixed teams have a slightly lower percentage (58.45 
%) on the acquirer side. On the target side boutique advisors have a larger percentage of tender 
offers (75.21%) while and mixed advisors are only at around 55%. 
 The last column illustrates the average cross-sectional premiums and their differences. 
Boutiques seem to be able to be able to obtain lower premiums than full-service banks on the 
acquirer side, and the highest premiums for the target side. The difference compared with the full-
service banks is not significant however. On the other hand, mixed teams seem to be able to obtain 
significantly lower premiums than full-service advisors on the acquiring side. 
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Table 3 - Deal characteristics by the type of financial advisors 
This table presents summary statistics for the 906 M&A transactions, sorted by the type of financial advisor. Data are for deals 
announced during the period 1987 and 2013 in which the acquirer and the target have at least one financial advisor. Deal Size is 
the deal value in $ millions Acquirer Assets is the total asset value measured from the last 12 months prior to announcement as 
given by SDC; Relative Size is defined as the ratio of acquirer size to target size. Target M/B is defined as the ratio of the market 
value of equity relative to the book value, which is the common equity as of the date of the most current financial information 
prior to the announcement of the transaction as given by SDC. % Hostile is the percentage of deals in which the deal is hostile 
(SDC hostile flag). % Tender is the percentage of deals in which a tender offer was used (SDC tender flag). % Stock offer is the 
percentage of deals with at least 50% of the consideration offered in acquirer's equity (SDC stock swap flag). Premium is the 
premium of the offer price to target closing stock price one day prior to the original announcement date as given by SDC. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: sorted by acquirers' advisory team             
Acquirer advisor type 
Average 
deal size 
(mil. $) 
Average 
acq. assets 
(mil. $) 
Average 
relative 
size 
Average 
target 
M/B 
% 
Hostile 
% 
Tender 
% Stock 
offer 
Average 
premium 
(1) Full-service 2,663.8 60,034.7 32.34 3.66 11.09 % 64.06 % 45.47 % 28.32 % 
N=640         
(2) Boutique 792.3 15,535.0 71.76 2.29 9.68 % 64.52 % 39.52 % 26.61 % 
N=142         
(3) Mixed team 7,014.1 75,072.4 5.97 2.80 13.38 % 58.45 % 55.63 % 23.94 % 
N=124         
Total 3,089.5 56,301.1 33.60 3.34 11.26 % 63.25 % 46.25 % 27.40 % 
         
Mean difference         
(1)-(2): t-test 10.09 4.15 -1.23 1.53 0.48 -0.10 1.23 0.58 
 +*** +*** - + + - + + 
Mean difference:         
(1)-(3): t-test -3.37 -0.79 3.95 0.96 -0.73 1.23 -2.20 1.79 
 -*** - +*** + - + -** +* 
Panel B: sorted by target's advisory team             
Target advisor type 
Average 
deal size 
(mil. $) 
Average 
acq. assets 
(mil. $) 
Average 
relative 
size 
Average 
target 
M/B 
% 
Hostile 
% 
Tender 
% Stock 
offer 
Average 
premium 
(1) Full-service 2,621.5 49,158.5 27.26 2.85 11.22 % 63.14 % 46.63 % 26.21 % 
         
(2) Boutique 344.9 22,896.8 56.50 3.18 9.09 % 75.21 % 42.98 % 32.37 % 
         
(3) Mixed team 6,966.1 109,089.2 40.98 5.35 13.04 % 54.66 % 47.20 % 28.27 % 
         
Total 3,089.5 56,301.1 33.60 3.34 11.26 % 63.25 % 46.25 % 27.40 % 
         
Mean difference:         
(1)-(2): t-test 40.16 1.61 -1.26 -0.60 0.62 -2.50 0.69 -1.57 
 +*** + - - + -** + - 
Mean difference:         
(1)-(3): t-test -3.74 -2.92 -0.80 -0.88 -0.52 1.76 -0.12 -0.63 
  -*** -*** - - - +* - - 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Empirical tests on the choice of advisors 
Determinants of the choice of boutiques versus full-service advisors or mixed teams versus 
full-service advisors on either the acquirer or the target are examined using multivariate 
regressions. Following Song et al. (2013), I run multinomial logistic (multi-logit) regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the type of advisor with full-service advisors as the comparison 
type. Specifically, the first regression of each multi-logit model compares the deals advised by only 
boutique advisors with deals advised by only full-service advisors (the boutique vs. full-service 
regression) and the second regression compares deals advised by mixed teams with deals advised 
by only full-service advisors (the mixed team vs full-service regression). Consequently, the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable for deals advised by only boutique advisors (or mixed 
teams) and the deals with only full-service advisors are the base case. Table 4 presents the results. 
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Table 4 - Determinants of advisor choice 
In this table I examine the determinants of the use of a boutique advisor on the acquirer side (Panel A) and on the target side 
(Panel B). Data are for mergers and acquisitions announced between 1987 and 2013 in which either the acquirer or the target has 
at least one financial advisor. Deal Size is the deal value in $ millions. Ln(Deal Size) is the natural log of the Deal Size. Stock is 
a dummy that equals to one for deals with at least 50% of the consideration in acquirer's equity. Hostile is a dummy that equals 
to one if the deal is hostile. Toehold is the fraction of target shares held by the acquirer before deal announcement. Cross Industry 
is a dummy that equals to one if the acquirer and target are in different industries (firms are categorized as being in different 
industries if the two-digit sic codes do not match). Cross Border is a dummy that equals to one if the acquirer and target are 
incorporated in different countries. Competition is a dummy that equals to one if the deal has more than one bidder. Target ROE 
is the ratio of net income to common equity for the 12 months ending on the date of the most current financial information prior 
to the announcement of the transaction as in SDC. Target D/E is the target total debt divided by common equity as of the date of 
the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction. Z-values are presented in parentheses below 
the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Multi-logit regression on advisor choice by the acquirer 
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed 
Ln(Deal Size)  -0.278***  0.293***  -0.381***  0.206**  -0.248***  0.346*** 
  (21.76)  (30.70)  (11.89)  (4.90)  (10.38)  (24.07) 
Stock  -0.208  0.126  -0.029  0.411  -0.232  -0.030 
  (0.94)  (0.37)  (0.01)  (1.49)  (0.77)  (0.01) 
Hostile  -0.073  -0.072  1.028  -0.328  -0.196  -0.059 
  (0.04)  (0.06)  (1.38)  (0.16)  (0.25)  (0.03) 
Toehold  -0.294  -0.731  -0.244  -0.603  -0.196  -0.843 
  (0.11)  (0.63)  (0.03)  (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.48) 
Cross Industry  0.050  0.023  0.011  0.128  0.089  -0.066 
  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.06) 
Cross Border  -0.166  -0.349  -0.174  -0.206  -0.223  -0.506* 
  (0.47)  (2.52)  (0.22)  (0.39)  (0.47)  (2.78) 
Competition  0.136  0.264  -1.189  0.253  0.503  0.172 
  (0.20)  (1.01)  (2.13)  (0.33)  (2.17)  (0.26) 
Target M/B  -0.005  -0.006  -0.001  -0.020  -0.007  -0.003 
  (0.16)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.50)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Target ROE  -0.048  -0.028  -0.527  -0.070  -0.037  -0.012 
  (0.65)  (0.18)  (2.00)  (0.06)  (0.26)  (0.03) 
Target D/E  -0.056  -0.011  -0.180*  -0.034  -0.034  0.000 
  (2.30)  (0.34)  (3.47)  (0.93)  (0.46)  (0.00) 
Constant  3.98***  -7.41***  6.20***  -5.61***  3.31**  -8.43*** 
  (11.80)  (46.89)  (8.47)  (8.96)  (4.87)  (34.38) 
Observations  764  782  274  289  490  493 
R-square  0.079  0.086  0.166  0.073  0.066  0.104 
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Panel B: Multi-logit regression on advisor choice by the target 
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed 
Ln(Deal Size)  -0.467***  0.257***  -0.453***  0.396***  -0.458***  0.163** 
  (46.93)  (25.55)  (10.20)  (18.20)  (30.68)  (5.96) 
Stock  -0.020  -0.261  -0.485  -0.530  0.125  -0.192 
  (0.01)  (1.77)  (0.98)  (2.65)  (0.24)  (0.55) 
Hostile  -0.011  -0.016  -12.648  -0.266  0.002  0.142 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.19) 
Toehold  -1.848*  0.123  -4.144  1.379  -1.297  -0.737 
  (3.06)  (0.03)  (2.55)  (1.43)  (1.18)  (0.43) 
Cross Industry  0.052  -0.232  0.431  -0.450  -0.101  -0.153 
  (0.06)  (1.51)  (0.99)  (2.16)  (0.16)  (0.37) 
Cross Border  0.204  -0.338  -0.057  -0.316  0.324  -0.202 
  (0.67)  (2.70)  (0.02)  (1.03)  (1.09)  (0.49) 
Competition  0.056  0.119  0.342  -0.095  0.035  0.333 
  (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (1.13) 
Target M/B  0.008  0.005  0.011  -0.037  0.037  0.011 
  (0.61)  (1.34)  (0.57)  (1.15)  (1.88)  (0.94) 
Target ROE  -0.018  -0.088  -0.656  -0.318  0.064  0.007 
  (0.05)  (0.82)  (2.39)  (1.85)  (0.39)  (0.01) 
Target D/E  -0.014  0.008  0.004  0.039  -0.025  -0.024 
  (0.20)  (0.42)  (0.00)  (2.19)  (0.22)  (0.46) 
Constant  7.356***  -6.338***  6.985***  -8.935***  7.181***  -4.619*** 
  (32.76)  (37.46)  (6.67)  (21.84)  (21.69)  (11.97) 
Observations  745  785  260  303  485  482 
Pseudo R-square   0.141   0.070   0.198   0.164   0.131   0.050 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for the acquirer side analysis. As shown by Song et 
al. (2013) deal size is an important determinant in the acquirer’s selection of advisor(s). The results 
of their study show that for larger deals, acquirers are more likely to hire full-service advisors than 
boutique advisors, which is consistent with the scale hypothesis. My study confirms this in all 
samples. Additionally, the likelihood of an acquirer hiring a mixed team of advisors increases with 
deal size as it did in the study Song et al. (2013). This implies that for large deals, acquirers utilize 
the scale advantages that full-service banks offer as well as the expertise that boutique advisors 
offer. As seen in the earlier section in the descriptive studies, large deals advised by mixed teams 
are more likely to be mergers of equals, which double the size of the acquirer, meaning the acquirers 
have more at stake and the deal is more complex. Large deals have also been shown to be more 
complex in earlier M&A literature (e.g. Servaes & Zenner, 1996). This can be interpreted, to some 
extent, that boutique advisors provide expertise in complicated and important deals through their 
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use in mixed teams. However, this is contradictory with the skill hypothesis giving that that the 
smaller the deal, the more likely that boutiques are hired. Nonetheless, due to the several sub-
hypotheses in this study related to the skill hypothesis, I examine this relation more closely than by 
just looking at deal size. 
Regardless of the significant findings related to deal size, there are almost no other 
statistically significant findings in Table 4 for the regressions on advisor choice for the acquirer 
side. This suggests that apart from the deal size, there are no other deal characteristics, which would 
lead to choosing a boutique advisor or a mixed team on the acquiring side. This is inconsistent with 
the findings of Song et al. (2013) who find that when acquirers face hostile targets, they are more 
likely to choose boutique advisors. The only other statistically significant coefficients are the Cross 
Border-variable of the tender sub-sample and the Target D/E-variable of the merger sub-sample. 
The coefficient for Cross Border is negative, which actually implies that the probability for hiring 
mixed teams in cross-border deals is smaller. This evidence is in fact against the skill hypothesis 
Panel B of Table 4 presents results for the target side analysis. Consistent with the results 
on the acquirer side, deal size seems to be the most important characteristic in determining the type 
of advisors that target firms employ. Here we see that target firms are also more likely to hire full-
service advisors than boutique advisors for larger deals. The coefficient for mixed teams is again 
positive and significant, implying that targets also utilize the scale capabilities of the full-service 
investment banks and the expertise of the boutique advisors. Consistent with the acquirer side 
analysis, there is no evidence in support of the skill hypothesis. The only significant coefficient 
besides the deal size coefficients is the coefficient for the variable Toehold for boutique advisors 
in the full sample. The coefficient is negative at the 10% significance level implying that boutiques 
are used less when the acquirer has previous ownership in the target company. 
When comparing with the research of Song et al. (2013), they find evidence from the similar 
regression analyses that when the transaction is financed with the acquirer’s stock (the Stock 
dummy equals one for stock offers), the probability of the target hiring a boutique advisor 
increases, which is consistent with the skill hypothesis. However, I do not find evidence of this as 
the coefficients are insignificant.   
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Consequently, while I find significant evidence in support of the scale hypothesis for both 
sides, I find no evidence for the skill hypothesis. Song et al. (2013), who find some evidence to 
support the skill hypothesis, mention that the weak evidence in their study could be due to the 
potential coexistence of the skill and the scale hypotheses. This means that firms may choose 
boutique advisors for different reasons. Boutique advisors can be chosen because of their expertise 
while others may choose them because of the small size of the deals. Deal size can help to separate 
the effects of these two reasons to choose boutique advisors. Boutique banks may be employed for 
smaller deals because merging firms can lack alternatives as full-service investment banks may 
choose not to take on smaller deals because of smaller fees. Thus, if all deals in the sample consist 
of large deals, merging firms are less likely to face such constraints for the choice of advisors. In 
the latter case, firms that hire boutique advisors are more likely to do so for their skill or expertise. 
Therefore, I run robustness tests on a restricted sub-sample based on deal size. Table 5 presents the 
deal size distribution at different percentiles. 
Table 5 - Distribution of deal value ($ million) based on acquirer advisor types 
Percentile   Full Sample   Boutique sub-sample   Full-service sub-sample   Mixed team sub-sample   
10th  35                17                   38                       104     
20th  73                31                   75                       278     
30th  138                50                 140                       435     
40th  253                87                 239                       717     
43rd  301                94                 278                       875     
50th  430              130                 429                    1,309     
60th  737              258                 711                    2,241     
63rd  933              292                 850                    2,488     
70th  1,286              411              1,196                    4,780     
80th  2,706              787              2,616                    8,151     
90th  7,191           1,873              6,667                  16,199     
Total # of obs. N = 930               N = 128                 N = 659                       N = 143      
 
I rerun tests in Table 4 after using $300 million as the deal size cut-off, which corresponds 
to the 43rd percentile for the full sample, the 63rd percentile for the boutique sample, about the 
43rd percentile for the full-service sample, and about the 20th percentile for the mixed sample. The 
results are reported in Table 6. 
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Table 6 - Determinants of advisor choice (sample restricted by deal value ($300 mil.)) 
In this table, I rerun the same tests as in Table 4 using a sample restricted by deal size (cut-off at $300 mil.). I examine the 
determinants of the use of boutique advisors on the acquirer side (Panel A) and on the target side (Panel B). The results shown 
below are obtained using deals with a size of at least 300 million. All explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. Z-
values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Multi-logit regression on advisor choice by the acquirer  
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed 
Ln(Deal Size)  -0.368**  0.226***  0.131  0.303**  0.570**  0.204* 
  (5.77)  (7.28)  (0.33)  (4.70)  (6.01)  (3.28) 
Stock  -0.262  0.110  0.262  0.413  0.448  -0.173 
  (0.60)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (1.10)  (0.98)  (0.30) 
Hostile  -0.061  -0.013  -1.194  -0.904  0.605  -0.005 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (1.78)  (0.64)  (0.77)  (0.00) 
Toehold  -0.623  -0.874  -1.580  -0.931  2.682  -1.027 
  (0.20)  (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.32)  (1.55)  (0.52) 
Cross Industry  0.114  -0.202  -0.102  -0.520  0.187  0.108 
  (0.13)  (0.79)  (0.03)  (2.13)  (0.19)  (0.12) 
Cross Border  -0.017  -0.259  0.271  -0.110  -0.250  -0.364 
  (0.00)  (1.13)  (0.22)  (0.08)  (0.31)  (1.20) 
Competition  -0.364  0.466  0.963  0.317  0.045  0.452 
  (0.48)  (2.53)  (0.71)  (0.37)  (0.01)  (1.54) 
Target M/B  -0.009  -0.012  -0.004  -0.040  0.044  -0.005 
  (0.19)  (0.44)  (0.03)  (0.65)  (0.85)  (0.15) 
Target ROE  0.133  0.130  0.879  -0.115  -0.778  0.407 
  (0.26)  (0.23)  (2.56)  (0.07)  (1.80)  (0.68) 
Target D/E  -0.060  -0.005  0.199  -0.031  0.062  -0.002 
  (1.62)  (0.06)  (2.62)  (0.72)  (0.20)  (0.01) 
Constant  5.907*  -5.903***  -0.895  -7.524**  -10.361**  -5.429** 
  (3.45)  (11.23)  (0.04)  (6.52)  (4.65)  (5.35) 
Observations  417  482  184  213  233  269 
Pseudo R-square  0.057  0.051  0.106  0.096  0.124  0.052 
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Panel B: Multi-logit regression on advisor choice by the target  
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed 
Ln(Deal Size)  -0.796***  0.377***  -0.221  0.468***  -0.916***  0.271** 
  (11.91)  (20.43)  (0.30)  (12.98)  (9.60)  (5.26) 
Stock  -0.722*  -0.284  -12.561  -0.483  -0.200  -0.200 
  (2.98)  (1.42)  (0.01)  (1.78)  (0.17)  (0.36) 
Hostile  0.228  0.150  -11.613  -0.165  0.330  0.382 
  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.28)  (1.00) 
Toehold  -2.375  0.143  -1.509  1.695  -2.343  -1.370 
  (1.46)  (0.02)  (0.12)  (1.68)  (1.00)  (0.77) 
Cross Industry  0.432  -0.171  1.235*  -0.454  0.006  0.051 
  (1.39)  (0.56)  (2.79)  (1.72)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Cross Border  0.226  -0.286  0.198  -0.175  0.342  -0.235 
  (0.32)  (1.45)  (0.07)  (0.26)  (0.46)  (0.46) 
Competition  0.275  0.133  0.257  0.020  0.367  0.274 
  (0.27)  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.36)  (0.51) 
Target M/B  -0.001  0.006  0.009  -0.060  0.039  0.011 
  (0.00)  (1.67)  (0.02)  (2.00)  (0.47)  (1.05) 
Target ROE  -0.117  -0.169  -0.755  0.067  0.078  -0.219 
  (0.13)  (0.50)  (1.59)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.47) 
Target D/E  -0.026  0.009  -0.110  0.034  -0.048  -0.003 
  (0.27)  (0.50)  (0.34)  (1.62)  (0.15)  (0.02) 
Constant  14.253  -9.025  2.261  -10.618  16.651  -7.046 
  (9.26)  (25.68)  (0.07)  (14.69)  (7.75)  (7.93) 
Observations  409  493  169  220  240  273 
Pseudo R-square   0.147   0.078   0.358   0.142   0.136   0.078 
 
A comparison of the results in Table 6 and those in Table 4 doesn’t give additional evidence 
in support of the skill hypothesis. This is inconsistent with the study of Song et al. (2013). The most 
interesting findings are in the target side merger sample where the Cross Industry coefficient is 
significantly positive implying that boutique advisors are more likely to be used by targets in cross-
industry mergers. For cross-industry deals my hypothesis states that expertise would be needed on 
the acquirer side and therefore this is not evidence that would support the skill hypothesis. 
However, it is not obvious that specialized expertise wouldn’t be needed on the target side. 
Additionally, the coefficient for the Stock coefficient for boutique advisors in the full sample is 
negative and significant. This on the other hand is evidence against the skill hypothesis. Therefore 
the results in Table 4 and Table 6 give no evidence in support of the skill hypothesis and actually 
one finding that implies that boutique advisors would actually be less likely to be chosen for 
complex deals. 
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Song et al. (2013) state that using other deal size cut-offs yield qualitatively similar results. 
Nevertheless, I try different cut-offs to see if the skill hypothesis is more apparent in samples with 
larger deals. I rerun the tests again after using $500 million as the deal size cut-off, which yields 
more interesting results. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Table 7 - Determinants of advisor choice (sample restricted by deal value ($500 mil.)) 
In this table, I rerun the same tests as in Table 4 and Table 6 using a sample restricted by deal size (cut-off at $500 mil.). I 
examine the determinants of the use of boutique advisors on the acquirer side (Panel A) and on the target side (Panel B). The 
results shown below are obtained using deals with a size of at least 500 million. All explanatory variables are defined in the 
previous tables. Z-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Multi-logit regression on advisor choice by the acquirer 
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed 
Ln(Deal Size) -0.295  0.290***  -0.102  0.281*  -0.582*  0.318** 
  (2.29)  (8.27)  (0.12)  (3.08)  (3.40)  (5.21) 
Stock  0.095  0.405  -0.028  0.727*  -0.267  0.058 
  (0.06)  (2.24)  (0.00)  (2.82)  (0.21)  (0.02) 
Hostile  0.095  0.405  1.574*  0.727  -0.267  0.058 
  (0.14)  (0.44)  (2.89)  (0.52)  (1.46)  (0.36) 
Toehold  -0.148  -0.212  3.022  -0.143  -4.359  -0.543 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (2.14)  (0.01)  (1.89)  (0.12) 
Cross Industry 0.715*  0.150  0.297  0.356  1.153**  0.107 
  (3.47)  (0.35)  (0.22)  (0.88)  (3.98)  (0.09) 
Cross Border 0.264  -0.081  -0.420  -0.029  1.061*  -0.172 
  (0.43)  (0.09)  (0.39)  (0.01)  (3.18)  (0.22) 
Competition -0.177  0.580*  -0.240  0.425  0.215  0.492 
  (0.09)  (3.36)  (0.04)  (0.63)  (0.09)  (1.44) 
Target M/B  -0.008  -0.010  0.009  -0.037  -0.055  -0.005 
  (0.12)  (0.30)  (0.15)  (0.54)  (1.21)  (0.12) 
Target ROE  0.094  0.122  -2.410**  -0.257  0.760  0.377 
  (0.11)  (0.16)  (4.96)  (0.23)  (1.65)  (0.38) 
Target D/E  -0.069  0.002  -0.361*  -0.031  -0.103  0.050 
  (1.91)  (0.01)  (3.16)  (0.70)  (0.50)  (0.96) 
Constant  3.717  -7.836***  0.158  -7.770**  9.503  -8.163*** 
  (0.81)  (12.82)  (0.00)  (5.00)  (2.05)  (7.43) 
Observations 343  404  157  186  186  218 
Pseudo R-square  0.061  0.073  0.187  0.104  0.212  0.088 
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Panel B: Multi-logit regression on advisor choice by the target  
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed   Boutique   Mixed 
Ln(Deal Size) -1.183***  0.383***  -0.455  0.612***  -1.665***  0.199 
  (10.88)  (15.08)  (0.57)  (15.37)  (9.79)  (1.97) 
Stock  -0.901*  -0.415  -21.726  -0.511  -0.328  -0.355 
  (3.05)  (2.60)  (0.05)  (1.68)  (0.27)  (0.97) 
Hostile  -0.038  -0.012  -11.614  -0.612  0.162  0.208 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.49)  (0.04)  (0.25) 
Toehold  -3.664  -0.094  -0.532  1.392  -5.337  -1.409 
  (1.84)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.92)  (2.01)  (0.78) 
Cross Industry 0.321  -0.108  0.578  -0.422  -0.155  0.115 
  (0.51)  (0.20)  (0.36)  (1.26)  (0.07)  (0.11) 
Cross Border -0.094  -0.397  0.015  -0.085  0.068  -0.459 
  (0.04)  (2.48)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (1.61) 
Competition 0.352  -0.038  -0.069  -0.355  0.673  0.173 
  (0.37)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.36)  (0.91)  (0.18) 
Target M/B  0.000  0.006  0.109  -0.070  0.044  0.010 
  (0.00)  (1.70)  (0.63)  (2.17)  (0.32)  (0.99) 
Target ROE  -0.075  -0.288  -2.789  -0.090  0.124  -0.341 
  (0.05)  (1.09)  (2.52)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.87) 
Target D/E  -0.046  0.035  -0.518  0.031  -0.128  0.029 
  (0.57)  (2.49)  (1.63)  (1.28)  (0.77)  (0.37) 
Constant  22.794***  -9.033***  7.908  -13.790***  32.769***  -5.207* 
  (9.46)  (17.84)  (0.41)  (16.51)  (8.96)  (2.93) 
Observations 329  412  145  192  184  220 
Pseudo R-square 0.195   0.081   0.395   0.177   0.250   0.063 
 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results for the acquirer side. For the full sample, I find that 
the probability of employing a boutique advisor increases when the target is not in the same 
industry, which I hypothesize to increase complexity for the acquirer. The Cross Industry variable 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level.17 The coefficient for the Cross Industry 
variable is also significant for the tender offer sample at the 5% level implying that acquiring firms 
recognize the industry specific expertise that boutiques have. For the merger sample, additional 
measures related to deal complexity can be attributed to the choice of boutique advisors. The 
Hostile dummy is positive and significant indicating that when acquirers face hostile targets in 
                                                 
17 Using a cut-off of $1 billion yields the same finding. 
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mergers, they are more likely to choose boutique advisors. Finally, the tender offer sample also 
supports for the skill hypothesis as the coefficient for the Cross Country dummy is positive and 
significant at the 10% level indicating that boutique advisors are hired when the acquirer is 
acquiring a target from another country or from a different industry. 
 In addition to evidence supporting the skill hypothesis for boutiques, the full sample also 
shows some evidence when looking at the regressions for mixed teams vs. full-service advisors. 
Mixed teams are more likely to be hired when there is competition between bidders. The coefficient 
for Competition is positive and significant at the 10% level. Further evidence relating to the skill 
hypothesis is seen from the positive and significant (10% level) Stock dummy. In terms of firm 
characteristics, there is little or mixed evidence that these characteristics would affect the type of 
advisors that merging firms choose. 
Panel B of Table 7, which reports the results for the acquirer side, does not provide evidence 
in support of the skill hypothesis. Table 6 showed that the coefficient for the Stock coefficient for 
boutique advisors in the full sample is negative and significant. This evidence is persistent for this 
cut-off providing additional support that boutiques are less likely to be used when the acquirer uses 
stock as payment.18 
The restricted sample with the cut-off at $500 million shows some evidence for the skill 
hypothesis on the acquirer side. The reason this evidence doesn’t show up in Table 4 and Table 6 
is possibly due to the coexistence of the skill and scale hypotheses. This sample provides evidence 
that acquirers use boutiques for specialized industry expertise, which is something commonly 
attributed to boutiques, while also giving evidence that boutiques are chosen for other types of 
complex deals (although this evidence is restricted to either the merger or the tender offer sub-
samples). Interestingly, I can also conclude that boutiques are less likely to be chosen by target 
firms when the form of payment is stock. This is evidence against the skill hypothesis. 
Furthermore, it is also possible that the boutique advisors that are capable of acting as 
advisors on larger deals, because of additional resources, are in fact considered to be more skilled 
than other boutiques and advisors in general, and are therefore hired for more complex deals. This 
implies that not all boutiques are equal, and that the ones that are capable of advising on larger 
                                                 
18 Using a cut-off of $1 billion yields the same finding. 
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deals, are the ones that will face the most complex deals. This is in implication that is also brought 
up by Song et al. (2013). 
5.2. The impact of advisor choice on deal outcomes 
5.2.1. Deal premium 
M&A advisors can have an impact on various different aspects of M&A transactions and 
their outcomes and the deal premium is perhaps the most significant of these. Deal premium is the 
percentage difference between the price offered by the acquirer and the market price of the target. 
SDC offers deal premiums one day prior to the announcement date, which are calculated as the 
percentage change of the offer price to the target’s closing stock price one day prior to the original 
announcement date. For deals missing the SDC premium, I use the total value of consideration paid 
by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses, and compare it with the target’s market value of 
equity four weeks prior to the bid announcement19.  
Song et al. (2013) report a negative and significant relationship between the use of boutique 
advisors on the acquirer side and the deal premium. This implies that boutique advisors are able to 
negotiate lower premiums for their acquirer. I find evidence for this in the full sample and in the 
tender offer sub-sample. For the full sample, I find that the use of boutiques by the acquirer leads 
to a decrease in deal premium of 6.7% (Column 2). The interaction term for the advisor being 
boutique and Tier 2 is insignificant. As boutiques are only found in Tier 2 and 3 rankings, the 
implications of my findings are that Tier 3 boutiques are able to significantly lower deal premiums 
compared with full-service advisors, but Tier 2 are not.  
The target side gives a significant coefficient for the use of boutique advisors in mixed 
teams. For the full sample, I find that the use of mixed teams by the target leads to an increase in 
deal premium of 4.5% (column 1). The effect is not significant in the sub-samples. However, the 
boutique variable is insignificant. Interestingly, I find that the use of Tier 1advisors by the target 
leads to a decrease in deal premium of 9.27% (column 1). The result is significant at the 1% level 
                                                 
19 Officer (2003) uses the aggregate amount of each form of payment offered to target shareholders recorded in the 
SDC and compares it with the target’s market value of equity 43 trading days before the bid announcement to compute 
the premium. As the target’s market value of equity is given for only 4 weeks prior by SDC, I apply this for calculating 
the premiums. 
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and the effect is consistent and significant in all samples. Tier 2 advisors yield similar but less 
significant results for the target side. Additionally, the interaction term between the variable Target 
Boutique and Target Tier 2 is significantly positive implying that Tier 2 boutique advisors are able 
to gain better premiums for their clients than other Tier 2 advisors.  
Prior studies show that deal premium is significantly smaller when the acquirer has a 
toehold (e.g. Schwert, 1996; Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Goldman and Qian, 2005; Song et al. 2013). 
I find the same effect for the tender offer sub-sample. Additionally, I find that deal premiums are 
significantly smaller when the payment form is a stock swap and when the parties of the deal are 
in different industries (column 1). Premiums are significantly higher when the parties come from 
different countries, when the deal is a tender offer, and when there is competition between bidders 
(column 1).  
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Table 8 - Impact of advisors on deal premiums (OLS regressions) 
In this table, I run OLS regressions to examine how the types of advisors (boutique, full-service or a mixed team of both) affect 
deal premiums. I examine the full sample in models 1 and 2, the merger sub-sample in models 3 and 4, and the tender sub-sample 
in models 5 and 6. Acquirer Boutique is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the acquirer is advised by boutique advisors. 
Acquirer Mixed is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the acquirer is advised by a mixed team of both boutique and full-
service advisors. Target Boutique is a dummy variable equal to one when the target is advised by boutique advisors. Target 
Mixed is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the target is advised by a mixed team of both boutique and full-service 
advisors. Target (Acquirer) Advisor Tier is the tier (1–3) of target (acquirer) advisors ranked by market share. Tier 1 is the top 
five advisors, Tier 2 is the sixth through the 20th advisors, and Tier 3 is the remainder. Target (Acquirer) Advisor Tier 1(2) is a 
dummy that is equal to one when the target (acquirer) advisor is ranked in Tier 1 (2). Acquirer Advisor Tier 2 * Aboutique is the 
interaction term of two dummy variables, Acquirer Advisor Tier 2 and Acquirer Boutique dummy.   Target advisor Tier 2 ∗ 
Tboutique is the interaction term of two dummy variables, Target Advisor Tier 2 and Target Boutique dummy. All other 
explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. T-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
    Full Sample  Merger sub-sample  Tender offer sub-sample 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Acquirer Boutique  -6.499  -6.654*  -1.689  -2.264  -8.554*  -8.483* 
  (-1.63)  (-1.67)  (-0.22)  (-0.29)  (-1.83)  (-1.81) 
Acquirer Mixed  -2.501  -2.765  -1.947  -2.158  -2.690  -2.983 
  (-0.90)  (-1.00)  (-0.41)  (-0.45)  (-0.79)  (-0.87) 
Target Boutique  -3.520  -3.514  -4.419  -4.333  -3.020  -2.837 
  (-0.87)  (-0.87)  (-0.45)  (-0.44)  (-0.69)  (-0.65) 
Target Mixed  4.454*  4.721*  2.757  2.700  4.388  4.970 
  (1.70)  (1.80)  (0.61)  (0.59)  (1.33)  (1.50) 
Ln(Deal Size)  -1.128*  -1.115  0.401  0.672  -1.809**  -1.811** 
  (-1.66)  (-1.64)  (0.31)  (0.51)  (-2.20)  (-2.20) 
Stock  -4.887**  -4.806**  -5.199  -4.957  -5.463**  -5.463** 
  (-2.40)  (-2.35)  (-1.34)  (-1.27)  (-2.26)  (-2.24) 
Toehold  -12.347  -12.695  -0.152  0.591  -20.021**  -20.846** 
  (-1.46)  (-1.50)  (-0.01)  (0.04)  (-1.94)  (-2.02) 
Hostile  4.562  4.339  5.603  5.546  4.269  3.942 
  (1.41)  (1.34)  (0.60)  (0.60)  (1.26)  (1.17) 
Cross Industry  -3.548*  3.603*  -3.970  -4.453  -3.804  -3.793 
  (-1.81)  (-1.83)  (-1.10)  (-1.21)  (-1.62)  (-1.61) 
Cross Border  4.317*  4.131*  6.464*  6.491*  3.287  2.882 
  (1.95)  (1.87)  (1.73)  (1.72)  (1.17)  (1.02) 
Competition  17.172***  17.072***  13.389**  12.925**  19.286  19.210 
  (6.00)  (5.96)  (2.35)  (2.24)  (5.85)  (5.82) 
Tender  10.772***  10.721***         
  (5.08)  (5.05)         
Acquirer Advisor Tier 1  0.267  0.304  2.381  2.347  -0.605  -0.647 
  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.43)  (0.42)  (-0.18)  (-0.19) 
Acquirer Advisor Tier 2  2.098  2.414  6.046  5.191  0.724  1.279 
  (0.74)  (0.85)  (1.04)  (0.88)  (0.22)  (0.39) 
Target Advisor Tier 1  -9.232***  -8.906***  -12.221**  -12.164**  -7.215**  -6.732* 
  (-3.20)  (-3.08)  (-2.22)  (-2.20)  (-2.09)  (-1.94) 
Target Advisor Tier 2  -5.120*  -5.098*  -5.579  -6.050  -5.000  -4.992 
  (-1.83)  (-1.82)  (-1.01)  (-1.08)  (-1.53)  (-1.52) 
Acquirer advisor Tier 
2 ∗ Aboutique 
 4.458  4.211  -5.600  -5.663  9.228  8.481 
  (0.76)  (0.72)  (-0.50)  (-0.50)  (1.33)  (1.22) 
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Target advisor Tier 
2 ∗ Tboutique 
 11.182*  11.230*  17.127  17.274  8.232  8.138 
  (1.88)  (1.88)  (1.31)  (1.32)  (1.23)  (1.21) 
Relative size    -0.001    0.007    -0.003 
    (-0.11)    (0.66)    (-0.54) 
Target M/B    -0.105    -0.071    -0.108* 
    (-1.86)    (-0.44)    (-1.84) 
Target ROE    -0.686    -2.116    -0.693 
    (-1.24)    (-0.76)    (-1.27) 
Target D/E    -0.135    -0.361    -0.087 
    (-0.83)    (-1.00)    (-0.47) 
Constant  47.103***  47.405***  14.207  10.078  72.242***  72.820*** 
  (3.64)  (3.64)  (0.57)  (0.40)  (4.72)  (4.74) 
Observations  906  906  333  333  573  573 
R-squared   0.135  0.140  0.075  0.081  0.118  0.125 
  
5.2.2. Self-selection bias 
When examining the effects of boutique advisors on transaction outcomes, Song et al. 
(2013) recognize that the use of boutique advisors is itself endogenously determined by merging 
firms.  
To control for potential self-selection bias, Song et al. (2013) utilize a two-stage procedure 
to examine the impact of boutique advisors on deal premium. The two-stage model consists of a 
treatment equation and a regression equation on the transaction outcome. I assume that there is an 
unobservable underlying variable, Boutique*, that determines whether a firm employs a boutique 
advisor. The treatment rule is that a boutique advisor is observed if Boutique* exceeds zero; 
otherwise, the firm does not hire a boutique advisor. Letting Zi denote a column vector of variables 
that predict whether a firm hires a boutique advisor, the first-stage treatment rule is given by 
𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖
∗ = 𝜑𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖, (1) 
Here 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖=1 if 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖
∗ > 0 and 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖=0 otherwise. I obtain probit 
estimates of the treatment equation Pr (𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖=1|Zi) = (Φ(𝜑𝑍𝑖). From these estimates, the 
hazard rate, ℎ𝑖, for each observation i is computed as ℎ𝑖= 𝜑(𝜙𝑍𝑖)/ Φ(𝜑𝑍𝑖), if 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖=1 or ℎ𝑖= 
−𝜑(𝜙𝑍𝑖)/{1 −  Φ(𝜑𝑍𝑖)], if 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖 = 0, where 𝜙 and Φ are the density and cumulative 
distribution functions of the standard normal distribution. The second stage regression model is 
given by 
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𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = ∝ +𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
The difference between Eq. (2) and the OLS is that the dummy variable on the use of 
boutique advisors in Eq. (2) is augmented by the hazard rate obtained from Eq. (1). The variables 
included in the vector Xi in Eq. (2) are those shown to have a significant impact on deal premium 
in previous research. 
Specifically, in the first stage I run probit regressions where the dependent variable is a 
dummy indicating the use of boutique advisors on the acquirer side. For explanatory variables, I 
use the natural logarithm of deal size, a dummy stating whether the form of payment is stock, a 
dummy stating whether the deal is hostile, a dummy variable indicating whether it is a cross-
industry deal, relative size (acquirer over target), and the target firm's characteristics (M/B, D/E, 
and ROE). From these probit estimates, I am able to calculate Zi for each deal, and then the hazard 
rates, hi utilizing the density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal 
distribution. This is done for the full sample, merger sub-sample, and tender offer sub-sample 
individually. 
In the second-stage regressions on deal premiums, I include variables that have been shown 
to have a significant impact on deal premiums. These include some of the variables used in the 
treatment equation, e.g., Deal Size, Hostile dummy, as well as variables that are not expected to 
influence the use of boutique advisors but are expected to affect deal premiums, such as Toeholds 
and Tender Offer dummy. The key variable that differentiates my two-step procedure from the 
OLS regression is the hazard rate of acquirer boutique advisors obtained from the first-stage 
treatment equation. The results are presented in Table 9. 
Song et al (2013) find supporting evidence from the two-step procedure related to findings 
in Table 8. I also find that the coefficients of Acquirer Boutique are highly negative. However, the 
coefficients are not statistically significant leaving these findings inconclusive 
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Table 9 - Impact of advisors on deal premiums (two-stage procedure) 
In this table, I examine only deals that are advised by either boutique or full-service advisors (Acquirer mixed dummy= 0 for 
step 1 and Acquirer mixed & Target mixed dummies = 0 in step 2). In step 1 of each model, I obtain the probit estimates of the 
treatment equation for “Aboutique”. From these estimates, the hazard rate for each observation is computed following Song et 
al. (2013). The coefficient of Acquirer Boutique variable is further obtained by augmenting the regression equation of step 2 
with the hazard rate. Z-values or t-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively 
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    Step (1)   Step (2)   Step (1)   Step (2)   Step (1)   Step (2) 
Acquirer Boutique    -28.354    -10.084    -28.710 
    (-0.79)    (-0.16)    (-0.64) 
Target Boutique    0.632    3.807    -0.784 
    (0.19)    (0.52)    (-0.22) 
Ln(Deal Size)  -0.154***  -1.945  -0.199***  1.078  -0.140  -2.976* 
  (23.86)  (-1.34)  (10.82)  (0.39)  (12.42)  (-1.70) 
Stock  -0.080  -5.403**  0.035  -7.123  -0.109  -5.340* 
  (0.47)  (-2.05)  (0.03)  (-1.34)  (0.58)  (-1.77) 
Toehold    -16.017    12.883    -29.153** 
    (-1.58)    (0.65)    (-2.48) 
Hostile  -0.018  6.145  0.323  13.875  -0.037  5.346 
  (0.01)  (1.51)  (0.47)  (1.10)  (0.03)  (1.29) 
Cross Industry  0.038  -4.075  0.010  -2.702  0.071  -5.507* 
  (0.11)  (-1.64)  (0.00)  (-0.55)  (0.25)  (-1.93) 
Cross Border    7.340***    11.062**    6.441* 
    (2.72)    (2.26)    (1.93) 
Competition    17.787***    16.733**    18.574*** 
    (4.86)    (2.22)    (4.54) 
Tender    11.000***         
    (4.21)         
Acquirer Advisor Tier 1    -0.674    -5.973    2.529 
    (-0.20)    (-0.92)    (0.63) 
Acquirer Advisor Tier 2    2.846    4.639    1.676 
    (0.94)    (0.75)    (0.47) 
Target Advisor Tier 1   -8.260**    -8.216    -8.435** 
    (-2.41)    (-1.22)    (-2.09) 
Target Advisor Tier 2   -3.048    -3.683    -2.757 
    (-1.03)    (-0.59)    (-0.83) 
Relative Size  0.000    0.000    0.000   
  (0.88)    (0.58)    (0.37)   
Target M/B  -0.003    0.000    -0.004   
  (0.20)    (0.00)    (0.12)   
Target ROE  -0.029    -0.372*    -0.020   
      (4.18)    (0.52)   
Target D/E  -0.035*    -0.113**    -0.020   
  (2.74)    (3.03)    (0.24)   
Lambda    12.362    2.634    12.653 
    (0.62)    (0.08)    (0.51) 
Constant  2.063***  65.682**  3.060***  0.450  1.748**  98.326 
  (10.87)  (1.98)  (6.53)  (0.01)  (4.97)  (2.45) 
Observations   764   633   274   228   490   405 
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5.2.3. Deal duration 
Deal duration refers to the number of days between the deal announcement date and the 
deal effective date or the withdrawn date. Longer deal duration indicates that the deal is more 
complex and therefore I run OLS regressions on the number of days from deal announcement to 
deal completion or withdrawal to determine the advisor’s effect on deal duration. I control for deal 
and firm characteristics and report the results in Table 10. 
Song et al. (2013) report that the use of boutique advisors on the acquirer side significantly 
lengthens deal duration. I do not find evidence of this in my sample, which indicates that deals 
advised by boutique advisors do not take longer to complete. This means that I do not find evidence 
in support of the skill hypothesis, and that according to this test, boutique advisors are not more 
likely to give advice on complex deals that require more due diligence and are more difficult to 
evaluate. 
I find significant evidence that mixed groups of advisors on the target side significantly 
lengthen the duration of the deal. This suggests that mixed teams on the target side are hired when 
the target firm is facing more complex deals (such as hostile deals or deals in which the form of 
payment is stock). 
Consistent with Song et al. (2013), my regression results indicate that deal size and the form 
of payment significantly impact deal duration. Larger deals are more complex (Servaes & Zenner, 
1996) and thus require more extensive evaluation and due diligence, which results in longer deal 
durations. This same rationale can be applied to deals where the form of payment in stock. I also 
find significant evidence that having toeholds has a significant and positive effect on deal duration. 
In tender offers, cross-border deals have a positive and significant effect on deal durations. 
Surprisingly, the Cross industry dummy is significantly negative for the full sample at the 10% 
level implying that when a deal is between parties from different industries, the deals take less time 
to complete. 
Overall, like Song et al. (2013), I find that deal complexity significantly impacts deal 
duration. However, I only find results consistent with the skill hypothesis regarding the use of 
mixed advisors on the target side. 
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Table 10 - Impact of advisors on deal duration 
Impact of advisors on deal duration. This table reports how the type of financial advisor (boutique, full-service or a mixture of both) 
affects the deal duration, measured as number of days from the deal announcement date to the deal completion or withdrawal date. 
I examine the full sample in models 1 and 2, the merger sub-sample in models 3 and 4, and the tender sub-sample in models 5 and 
6. All other explanatory variables are defined in previous tables. T-values are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Acquirer Boutique  -3.369  -3.171  2.305  1.797  -12.384  -11.855 
  (-0.31)  (-0.29)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (-1.29)  (-1.23) 
Acquirer Mixed  2.187  2.375  7.667  7.393  -2.216  -1.845 
  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (-0.24)  (-0.20) 
Target Boutique  2.831  2.804  -10.797  -10.707  7.610  7.355 
  (0.26)  (0.25)  (-0.36)  (-0.36)  (0.83)  (0.80) 
Target Mixed  20.034**  19.839**  34.098*  33.136  1.691  0.529 
  (2.08)  (2.05)  (1.68)  (1.60)  (0.19)  (0.06) 
Ln(Deal Size)  15.597***  15.587***  18.330***  18.441***  10.798  10.759 
  (6.21)  (6.20)  (3.14)  (3.09)  (4.81)  (4.78) 
Stock  15.928**  15.800**  32.998*  33.012*  4.928  4.523 
  (2.11)  (2.09)  (1.88)  (1.87)  (0.74)  (0.68) 
Toehold  107.386***  107.699***  243.272***  243.330***  12.296  13.172 
  (3.45)  (3.45)  (3.58)  (3.56)  (0.44)  (0.47) 
Hostile  -8.114  -7.931  -64.184  -64.762  5.836  6.288 
  (-0.68)  (-0.67)  (-1.54)  (-1.55)  (0.64)  (0.68) 
Cross Industry  -13.478*  -13.452*  -35.608**  -36.124**  -0.029  -0.158 
  (-1.86)  (-1.85)  (-2.16)  (-2.17)  (0.00)  (-0.02) 
Cross Border  -2.069  -1.939  -17.124  -16.925  14.811*  15.275** 
  (-0.25)  (-0.24)  (-1.02)  (-1.00)  (1.93)  (1.98) 
Competition  -0.494  -0.473  -18.851  -18.929  9.962  9.987 
  (-0.05)  (-0.04)  (-0.74)  (-0.73)  (1.10)  (1.11) 
Tender  -3.458  -3.454         
  (-0.44)  (-0.44)         
Acquirer Advisor Tier 1 -3.054  -2.975  -25.499  -26.110  9.781  10.249 
  (-0.30)  (-0.29)  (-1.06)  (-1.08)  (1.06)  (1.11) 
Acquirer Advisor Tier 2 -5.983  -6.143  -24.876  -25.674  10.241  9.701 
  (-0.64)  (-0.65)  (-1.06)  (-1.09)  (1.26)  (1.19) 
Target Advisor Tier 1 -7.930  -8.225  -10.499  -10.263  -0.796  -1.527 
  (-0.76)  (-0.79)  (-0.44)  (-0.42)  (-0.09)  (-0.16) 
Target Advisor Tier 2 0.676  0.617  11.393  12.014  -2.729  -2.744 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.50)  (0.52)  (-0.35)  (-0.35) 
Relative Size  -0.004  -0.004  -0.009  -0.007  0.007  0.007 
  (-0.23)  (-0.24)  (-0.18)  (-0.16)  (0.42)  (0.42) 
Target M/B    0.103    -0.347    0.224 
    (0.49)    (-0.48)    (1.40) 
Target ROE    0.596    -0.877    0.850 
    (0.29)    (-0.07)    (0.57) 
Target D/E    0.030    0.050    -0.079 
    (0.05)    (0.03)    (-0.16) 
Constant  -202.51***  -202.68***  -244.28**  -244.58**  -121.57***  -121.20*** 
  (-4.24)  (-4.24)  (-2.20)  (-2.17)  (-2.91)  (-2.89) 
Observations  906  906  333  333  573  573 
R-squared   0.108   0.108   0.161   0.161   0.127   0.131 
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5.2.3. Deal completion 
To examine whether the type of advisor has an impact of deal completion, I report the 
results of probit regressions with a binary dependent variable equal to one for completed deals and 
zero for withdrawn deals. The results (marginal effects) are reported in Table 10. I control for 
several firm and deal characteristics that have been shown to affect deal completion in prior studies. 
For example, previous studies have indicated that deal premium could affect deal completion (see, 
for example, Kisgen et al., 2009; Rau, 2000; Song et al. (2013).  My study shows that mixed teams 
on the acquirer significantly increase the likelihood of deal completion (column 1 and 2). However, 
the use of boutique advisors or mixed advisors on the acquirer side does not significantly affect 
deal completion. 
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Table 11 - Impact of advisors on deal completion 
I run probit regressions on deal completion. The dependent variable equals one if the deal is completed, zero if the deal is withdrawn. 
I examine the full sample in models 1 and 2, the merger sub-sample in models 3 and 4, and the tender sub-sample in models 5 and 
6. High Premium equals to one if the premium of the deal is higher than the median premium of the sample. Z-values are presented 
in parentheses below the marginal effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 
    Full Sample   Merger sub-sample   Tender offer sub-sample 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Acquirer Boutique -0.202  -0.201  -0.377  -0.371  -0.239  -0.246 
  (1.17)  (1.15)  (1.27)  (1.23)  (1.00)  (1.04) 
Acquirer Mixed 0.315*  0.307*  0.401  0.406  0.298  0.277 
  (3.30)  (3.13)  (2.46)  (2.49)  (1.43)  (1.22) 
Target Boutique -0.120  -0.129  0.141  0.151  -0.187  -0.200 
  (0.37)  (0.43)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.64)  (0.73) 
Target Mixed 0.078  0.069  -0.078  -0.104  0.157  0.157 
  (0.25)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (0.19)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
Ln(Deal Size) -0.044  -0.049  -0.018  -0.022  -0.065  -0.071 
  (1.11)  (1.35)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (1.35)  (1.58) 
Stock  -0.281**  -0.281**  -0.361*  -0.363*  -0.183  -0.178 
  (4.80)  (4.76)  (2.90)  (2.91)  (1.11)  (1.04) 
Toehold  0.868  0.851  2.285**  2.289**  0.004  -0.036 
  (2.15)  (2.06)  (4.42)  (4.42)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Hostile  -1.393***  -1.392***  -2.070***  -2.071***  -1.335***  -1.331*** 
  (65.45)  (65.08)  (14.56)  (14.49)  (51.77)  (51.01) 
Cross Industry -0.046  -0.052  0.093  0.082  -0.162  -0.173 
  (0.14)  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.96)  (1.08) 
Cross Border 0.100  0.109  0.155  0.154  0.073  0.094 
  (0.52)  (0.62)  (0.59)  (0.57)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
Competition -1.481***  -1.487***  -2.056***  -2.042***  -1.313***  -1.332*** 
  (101.31)  (100.21)  (47.99)  (46.14)  (52.56)  (52.83) 
Tender  0.676***  0.686***         
  (24.93)  (25.54)         
High Premium 0.040  0.048  0.029  0.035  0.087  0.094 
  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.25)  (0.28) 
Acquirer Advisor Tier 1 -0.344**  -0.351**  -0.894***  -0.907***  -0.178  -0.172 
  (4.07)  (4.19)  (7.72)  (7.90)  (0.62)  (0.57) 
Acquirer Advisor Tier 2 0.054  0.058  -0.560**  -0.560**  0.286  0.287 
  (0.10)  (0.12)  (3.13)  (3.09)  (1.64)  (1.64) 
Target Advisor Tier 1 -0.008  -0.018  -0.071  -0.071  0.088  0.077 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Target Advisor Tier 2 0.095  0.099  0.152  0.165  0.097  0.099 
  (0.35)  (0.38)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.23) 
Relative Size 0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.004 
  (1.15)  (1.23)  (0.51)  (0.52)  (0.62)  (0.71) 
Target M/B    0.000    -0.004    0.000 
    (0.01)    (0.21)    (0.01) 
Target ROE    0.079    0.048    0.103 
    (1.12)    (0.64)    (0.22) 
Target D/E    0.018    0.016    0.013 
    (1.43)    (0.10)    (1.46) 
Constant  2.112***  2.186***  2.094  2.166  3.018***  3.126*** 
  (6.78)  (7.12)  (2.44)  (2.50)  (7.90)  (8.27) 
Observations 906  906  333  333  573  573 
Pseudo R-squared 0.430  0.433  0.460  0.462  0.443  0.446 
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Table 12 – Summary of hypotheses and results 
This table demonstrates the hypotheses tested as well as a summary of the results found. Evidence for advisor choice is derived 
from Table 7, which utilizes a sample with a $500 mil. cut-off. Evidence for deal outcome analyses derived from Table 8, 9, 10 
& 11. Evidence against the hypotheses is presented in parentheses. 
Hypothesis Analysis type Sub-hypothesis Evidence 
Skill Advisor Choice Hostile Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer and 
target 
Acquirer Boutique coefficient significantly 
positive for mergers 
Competition Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
Acquirer Mixed coefficient significantly 
positive for the full sample 
Cross Industry Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
Acquirer Boutique coefficient significantly 
positive for the full sample and for tender 
offers 
Stock Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer and 
target 
Acquirer Mixed coefficient significantly 
positive of mergers 
(Target boutique coefficient significantly 
negative) 
Cross Border Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
Acquirer Boutique coefficient significantly 
positive for tender offers 
(Acquirer Mixed coefficient negative in 
some regressions) 
Deal Outcome Premium If acquirer uses 
boutique or mixed, 
premiums decrease 
Acquirer Boutique coefficient significantly 
negative for the full sample and the tender 
offer sub-sample 
If target uses boutique 
or mixed, premiums 
increase 
Target Mixed coefficient significantly 
positive for the full sample 
Target Boutique*Target Advisor Tier 2 
significantly positive 
Duration If acquirer uses 
boutique or mixed, 
durations increase 
No impact found on deal duration 
If target uses boutique 
or mixed, durations 
increase 
Target mixed coefficient significantly 
positive for the full sample & merger 
sample 
Completion If acquirer uses 
boutique or mixed, no 
impact on completion 
Acquirer mixed coefficient significantly 
positive for full sample 
If target uses boutique 
or mixed, no impact on 
completion 
No impact found on deal completion 
Scale Advisor Choice Deal size Full-service chosen for 
larger deals 
Significant evidence across samples 
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6. Discussion of Results 
In this section, I link the results of my analysis in the previous section to the literature 
review in Section 2 and my hypotheses of Section 3. I provide a brief overview of my results and 
discuss their implications. Table 12 presents a summary of my hypotheses and my results. 
6.1. Empirical findings of advisor choice 
I hypothesize that boutique advisors are more skilled and have more expertise in M&A than 
full-service investment banks. Therefore they are more likely to be chosen when the deal is 
complex. The first of my sub-hypotheses (H1.1) is developed to test if boutiques and mixed teams 
are employed by acquirers and targets when the deal is hostile. I find evidence from mergers (as 
opposed to tender offers) that boutiques are chosen by acquirers when they are facing a target with 
reluctant management. This evidence is found when utilizing a cut-off of $500 million for my full 
sample, which I utilize for summarizing the results for advisor choice. The cut-off method is 
applied because of the implications of the scale hypothesis. Boutique advisors are hypothesized to 
be smaller, and thus less capable of serving all the needs that full-service investment banks can 
serve with their more sizeable resources. Thus it is logical that most of the biggest transactions will 
go to full-service investment banks as they provide a broad spectrum of services in addition to 
advisory services. When using a high minimum cut-off for the sample, I am able to test the 
hypothesis in a sample of only large deals. Here, if boutiques are hired, it will most likely be due 
to their skills and expertise. Consequently, because there is evidence after applying the cut-off, I 
find some support for the skill hypothesis from this sub-hypothesis. 
The second sub-hypothesis (H1.2) states that boutique advisors and mixed teams are chosen 
by the acquirer when there is competition for the target. I find evidence that mixed teams are more 
likely to be chosen by the acquirer when there is competition for the target. However, there are no 
significant coefficients for the choice of boutique advisors. Overall from the tests on this sub-
hypothesis, I find weak support for the skill hypothesis through the choice of mixed advisors for 
the target. 
In my third sub-hypothesis (H1.3), I hypothesize that acquirers choose mixed or boutique 
advisors when they are acquiring targets from different industries. I find significant evidence that 
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acquirers are more likely to use boutique advisors when the target is from another industry. This 
evidence from the sample of larger deals shows evidence in support of the skill hypothesis. Cross-
industry deals require specialized industry-specific knowledge and boutique advisors usually 
specialize in certain industries. In conclusion, I find support for the skill hypothesis from the third 
sub-hypothesis and its analysis.  
The fourth sub-hypothesis (H1.4) is set to test whether boutique advisors and mixed teams 
are hired by acquiring and target firms when the form of payment is the shares of the acquiring 
company. The analyses show that mixed teams are more likely to be chosen by acquiring firms for 
mergers when the form of payment is stock. As payment with stock can be considered as an equity 
offering as well as a merger, the deal is much more complicated than a pure cash deal. However, 
as I find no evidence of boutique advisors alone being hired for deals where the payment is with 
stock, I conclude that this is weak support for the skill hypothesis. Additionally, I find significant 
evidence against the skill hypothesis on the target side. Boutiques are less likely chosen by targets 
when the acquirer pays with shares.  
Finally, the fifth and last sub-hypothesis (H1.5) for testing the skill hypothesis in the advisor 
choice analysis states that boutique advisors or mixed teams are employed by the acquirer for deals 
where the acquirer and target are from different countries. I find that boutique advisors are more 
likely to be employed by acquirers in tender offers. Nevertheless, I do not find evidence for the 
merger or the full sample. Therefore the evidence here in support of the skill hypothesis is weak. 
Overall, the empirical findings of the advisor choice analysis provide some, but generally 
weak support for the skill hypothesis as most findings are not founds in the full sample. However, 
given some of the evidence in support of the sub-hypotheses, I can conclude that boutique advisors 
are more likely to be chosen by acquirers when the target is from another industry. This is evidence 
that supports the general opinion that boutiques usually have industry specific expertise. I can also 
conclude that my analysis shows that boutiques are likely to be chosen for other complex deals 
such as hostile and cross-border deals. A suggestion for future studies would be to test if higher 
tier boutiques are more likely to be chosen for complex deals than full-service investment banks. 
In my regressions with larger deals, I find evidence in support of the skill hypothesis. An alternative 
interpretation is that boutique advisors are not created equal. Those that have a higher reputation, 
and have the resources to conduct larger deals, could possibly be acknowledged to have higher 
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expertise than other boutiques and advisors in general. This is also a hypothesis left for future 
studies to test. 
My first and only sub-hypothesis (H2.1) for the scale hypothesis states that both acquirers 
and targets will choose full-service advisors for larger deals. I find significant evidence throughout 
the regression analyses that support the hypothesis. This evidence supports the view that larger 
deals require more resources in terms of employees as well as financing capabilities, which full-
service investment banks have. Additionally, mixed teams are most likely employed for the biggest 
deals in the sample. This is consistent with the findings of Song et al. (2013). 
6.2. Empirical findings of deal outcomes 
The scale hypothesis doesn’t have any clear implications for deal outcomes. Consequently, 
this section focuses on the sub-hypotheses of the skill hypothesis with regard to deal outcomes.  
The first sub-hypothesis (H1.6) states that boutique advisors or mixed teams decrease 
(increase) premiums for acquiring (target) firms. The results for the regressions imply that the use 
of boutique advisors significantly decreases deal premiums for acquirers. However, while the 
results imply that the use of boutique firms decreases deal premiums, they do not decrease 
premiums when compared with other Tier 2 full-service advisors, which is shown by the 
statistically insignificant interaction term coefficient. Therefore my results show that only Tier 3 
advisors are able to decrease premiums. The results are interesting, because the advisor choice 
analyses imply that boutiques are chosen for large deals are also chosen for more complex deals. 
Additionally, larger deals are usually advised by higher tiered advisors. A possible implication 
worth studying in the future could be that boutiques are able to improve deal outcomes in deals of 
lesser complexity. I also find that mixed teams are capable of increasing deal premiums for targets 
while boutiques alone are not. Nevertheless, the coefficient for a boutique being Tier 2 is 
significantly positive meaning Tier 2 boutiques on the target side are able to improve premiums 
relative to other tier 2 advisors. This finding is inconsistent with the acquirer side. Admittedly, 
while the results are interesting and give some implications related to the skill of boutiques, the 
results here are mixed. The two-step procedure gives highly negative coefficients for boutique 
advisors on the acquirer side, but they aren’t statistically significant, and therefore do not provide 
clarification. 
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The next sub-hypothesis (H1.7) states that the use of boutique advisors or mixed teams 
increases deal durations for acquiring and target firms. The evidence from the OLS regressions 
shows that mixed teams increase deal duration on the target side. This suggests that mixed groups 
face more complex deals that require more extensive due diligence, longer negotiation processes, 
or tougher evaluations. However, there is no supporting evidence from the advisor choice 
regressions relating to mixed team advisors for the target side. Consequently, I conclude that there 
isn’t enough evidence in support of skill hypothesis in the analysis relating to deal duration. 
In my final sub-hypothesis (H1.8), I hypothesize that boutique advisors and mixed teams 
have no significant impact on deal completion on neither the target nor the acquirer side. I find 
evidence in support of the hypothesis, but because of the lack of statistically significant evidence 
relating to the other deal outcome regressions, the findings here are inconclusive.  
Overall, the empirical findings of the deal outcome analysis provide mixed evidence for the 
skill hypothesis. Consequently, I do not find conclusive evidence that boutique advisors would 
have significant impacts on deal outcomes. This is inconsistent with the study of Song et al. (2013). 
The reasons why I do not find enough evidence is partly because of my limited sample of European 
deals as my sample consists of less than half the amount of deals used in the study by Song et al. 
(2013). Other factors can also have an impact on the results. The classification of advisors is 
subjective, even though I use the same classification criteria as Song et al. (2013). In addition, the 
boutique advisors differ in the U.S. and in Europe and there could be fundamental differences in 
the market of advisory services. However, as many of my regressions give similar results, I can 
say that I have been able to accurately replicate the methodology used by Song et al. (2013). 
7. Conclusions 
 The research of Song et al. (2013) on boutique advisors and the role that they play in M&A 
in the U.S. is the foundation for my study on the same subject.  The contribution of my study to 
existing empirical M&A literature is the further testing of the two main hypotheses of their study 
with a sample of European M&A transactions. The aforementioned hypotheses are the skill and 
scale hypotheses. These hypotheses state that boutique advisors have specialized expertise in M&A 
(skill), but are small and lack the resources to act as advisors on the largest transactions (scale). 
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Boutique advisors have specialized expertise and independence, but they tend to be smaller and are 
definitely less diversified. In contrast, full-service advisors have greater resources and are 
diversified, but they suffer from potential conflicts of interest (Song et al. 2013).  
Utilizing a sample of 906 M&A deals, I conduct multiple empirical analyses to examine 
the reasons for the choice of advisors, and the impact of the types of advisors on deal outcomes. 
Furthermore, I use multivariate logistic regressions to examine the determinants of advisor choice, 
and both logistic and linear regressions to examine deal outcomes. These regressions are 
implemented for the full sample as well as a sub-sample consisting of mergers and a sub-sample 
consisting of tender offers. Among the 906 M&A deals from 1987 – 2013, 29.36% of the deals are 
advised by boutiques on the acquirer side, and 31.13% of the deals are advised by boutiques on the 
target side20.  
 The skill hypothesis is tested with eight different sub-hypotheses that are divided into two 
categories. The two categories are Advisor choice (sub-hypotheses related to the implications of 
skill and scale on the choice of advisors) and Deal outcome (sub-hypotheses related to the 
implications of skill on deal outcomes). My empirical results provide weak support for the skill 
hypothesis.  
For advisor choice, I find evidence that boutique advisors are hired by acquirers when the 
target is from another industry, which can be attributed to the industry specific expertise commonly 
credited to boutique advisors. In addition, my results show that in mergers, boutique advisors are 
more likely to be chosen when the deal is hostile and when the deal is financed with stock. In tender 
offers, boutiques are more likely to be chosen for cross-border transactions. I find that boutique 
advisors are hired as a part of a mixed team by acquirers when there is competition for the target 
and when the form of payment is stock. The finding related to competition is significant for the full 
sample while the finding related to the form of payment is significant for tender offers only. Despite 
this favorable evidence in support of the skill hypothesis, most of the results are not consistent 
throughout the samples (only two of the findings for boutiques and mixed teams are significant for 
the full sample) meaning the evidence is inconclusive.  
                                                 
20 Figures include boutiques, and boutiques as a part of a mixed team. 
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For deal outcomes, the evidence is mixed. I find that the choice of boutique advisors by 
acquirers improves deal outcomes by decreasing deal premiums. However, boutique advisors are 
not able to decrease premiums relative to other Tier 2 advisors, possibly suggesting that there are 
differences between the ranks of boutique advisors and the types of deals they are chosen to advise 
on. This is not included in the scope of this study, but is an interesting area for future research on 
boutique advisors. Mixed teams on the target side are also able improve deal outcomes by 
increasing premiums for their clients. Tier 2 boutiques are able to increase premiums relative to 
Tier 2 full-service advisors, which is inconsistent with the acquirer side results, which suggest that 
Tier 3 advisors are able to improve deal outcomes relative to full-service advisors but Tier 2 are 
not.  
I also find that when targets employ boutique advisors in mixed teams, the deal duration is 
significantly longer, but regressions yield insignificant coefficients for boutiques acting as the sole 
advisor on the acquirer and target side. Therefore deal duration analyses are inconclusive along 
with deal completion analyses. Overall, the empirical findings of the deal outcome analysis provide 
mixed and inconclusive evidence for the skill hypothesis.  
Consequently, when I combine the findings of the two categories of the skill hypothesis, I 
can conclude that my research finds some support for boutique advisors being chosen for their 
perceived expertise in M&A, but that this evidence is weak when looking at it holistically. Firms 
involved in M&A seem to recognize and appreciate the industry specific expertise of boutiques, 
and the results show that boutiques can be chosen for other complex deals either as the sole advisor 
or as a part of a mixed team. However, I am not able to show, like Song et al. (2013), that boutique 
advisors would deliver superior deal performance. I find some evidence related to this, but most of 
the results give mixed implications and are thus inconclusive. This is possibly due to a smaller 
sample size, or possibly due to fundamental differences in the European M&A advisory market. 
The most significant evidence in my study is related to the tests of the scale hypothesis. For 
Advisor choice, I find that boutique advisors are more likely used when the deal is small. On the 
other hand, mixed teams of advisors are used when deals are large. My results show that deal size 
is an important factor in determining how merging firms select financial advisors. Boutique 
advisors are less likely to be chosen by either acquirers or targets as deal size increases (compared 
with full-service investment banks). The scale hypothesis has no implications for deal outcomes. 
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My research tests the skill and scale hypotheses and focuses on advisor choice and deal 
outcomes. However, there are additional interesting topics for future research. My results indicate 
that there are differences between different tiered boutique advisors and their capabilities. This is 
logical as some boutiques have over a thousand employees while some consist of only tens of 
employees. An interesting topic for future research would be to test the differences of boutique 
advisors by reputational ranking, size or some other classification method. This would enable 
deeper analysis of boutique advisors by testing which types of boutique advisors are chosen for 
complex deals and which types of boutique advisors are able to improve deal outcomes. 
Furthermore, an empirical study of advisor type and advisor fees would be interesting 
giving that boutique advisors have been shown to be chosen for perceived skills, and previous 
studies have shown that they can have a positive impact on deal outcomes. Subsequently, while it 
may seem logical to think that the smallest boutique advisors with less reputation would charge 
lower fees, it doesn’t seem plausible that advisors that are perceived to be the most skillful in the 
M&A market would charge less on average than other advisors. These research questions are left 
out of the scope of this study, but are fascinating topics for research in the future. 
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9. Appendix 
Appendix 1- Advisor Ranking (KPMG not included because neither full-service nor 
boutique) 
Rank Financial Advisor Deal Value ($ Mil) Number of Deals 
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 4 129 248.92 1 628 
2 Morgan Stanley 3 729 405.09 1 733 
3 JP Morgan 3 327 266.97 2 179 
4 UBS 3 016 207.61 2 505 
5 Citi/Salomon Brothers/Salomon Smith Barney 2 777 126.52 2 045 
6 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 2 696 709.49 1 149 
7 Deutsche Bank 2 567 976.62 2 288 
8 Rothschild 2 563 236.68 2 943 
9 Credit Suisse 2 371 079.49 1 703 
10 Lazard 2 297 927.62 2 329 
11 BNP Paribas SA 1 723 014.63 1 758 
12 Nomura 1 496 735.73 937 
13 Commerzbank AG 1 025 738.86 1 234 
14 RBS 948 617.59 1 493 
15 HSBC Holdings PLC 846 037.85 1 599 
16 Societe Generale 733 698.66 1 096 
17 Credit Agricole CIB 703 426.12 890 
18 Barclays 621 129.23 655 
19 Mediobanca 606 293.60 578 
20 KPMG 415 497.97 4 644 
21 Santander 368 011.75 382 
 
Appendix 2 - Advisor classification 
Advisor Name Boutique Bear Stearns & Co Inc 0  Citi 0 
3i Corporate Finance Ltd 1  Bear Stearns International 0  Citicorp 0 
ABG Sundal Collier 0  Beeson Gregory Ltd 1  Citigroup 0 
ABN AMRO Bank 0  Berenberg Bank 0  Claudio Costamagna 1 
ABN AMRO Bank NV 0  Blackstone Group LP 1  Close Brothers Corp Finance 0 
ABN AMRO Hoare Govett 0  Blaettchen & Partner AG 1  Collins Stewart Ltd 0 
ABN AMRO Hoare Govett 
(UK) 
0  BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc 0  Commerzbank AG 0 
ABN-AMRO Holding NV 0  BNP Equities 0  CORPIN Partners 1 
Access Partners 1  BNP Paribas SA 0  County NatWest Limited 0 
AIB Corporate Finance 0  Borghesi Colombo & Associati 1  Credit Agricole CIB 0 
Alfred Berg A/S 1  Braveheart Financial Services 1  Credit Agricole Indosuez 0 
Alpha Finance AE 0  Brewin Dolphin 0  Credit Commercial de France 0 
Altium Capital Limited 1  Brewin Dolphin Investment 0  Credit Lyonnais 
Investissement 
0 
Ambrian Partners Ltd 1  Brewin Dolphin Securities Ltd 0  Credit Lyonnais Laing 0 
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Apax Partners & Co Ltd 1  Bridgewell 1  Credit Lyonnais SA 0 
Arbuthnot Securities Ltd 1  British Linen Advisers 1  Credit Lyonnais Secs 
(London) 
0 
Arctic Securities ASA 1  British Linen Bank Ltd 0  Credit Suisse 0 
Arthur Andersen 0  Broadview 1  Credit Suisse FB (Europe) 0 
Arthur Andersen Corp. Fin. 0  Broadview Associates 1  Credit Suisse First Boston 0 
Atlas Advisors 1  Brummer & Partners 1  Credit Suisse First Boston Int 0 
Aventum Partners 1  Bryan Garnier & Co 1  Credit Suisse First Boston/ CS 0 
AZ Capital 1  BT Alex Brown Inc 0  Credit Suisse Group 0 
Banc of America Securities 
LLC 
0  BT Alex. Brown/Wolfensohn 0  CreditAgricole-
CreditLyonnais 
0 
Banca IMI 0  Bucephale Finance 1  CS First Boston Corp 0 
Banca IMI (Intesa Sanpaolo) 0  BZW/Barclays PLC 0  Daniel Stewart 0 
Banca Popolare Emilia 
Romagna 
0  CA-IB Investmentbank AG 0  Danske Bank 0 
Banco Central 
Hispanoamericano 
0  CaixaBank SA 0  Danske Securities AB 0 
Banco de Negocios Argentaria 0  Calyon 0  Davy Corporate Finance 0 
Banco de Santander SA 0  Canaccord Genuity Ltd 0  DB Consult GmbH 0 
Banco Espirito Santo de Invstm 0  Capitalia SpA 0  DCB Bank Bhd 0 
Banco Santander Central Hisp 0  Caretti & Associati 1  De Zoete and Bevan 0 
Banco Santander SA 0  Carnegie 0  Deloitte & Touche 0 
Banexi Capital Partenaires SA 1  Catalyst Advisors BV 1  Deloitte & Touche Corp 
Finance 
0 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 0  Catella Sweden 1  DELOITTE (Spanish Office) 0 
Bank of Scotland 0  Cazenove & Co 0  Deloitte Corporate Finance 0 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsub-ishi 0  CCF Charterhouse 0  Detroyat Associes SA 1 
Bankers Trust / BT Wolfensohn 0  CDI Corporate Advisory AS 1  Deutsche Banc Alex Brown 0 
Banque Degroof 0  Cenkos Securities PLC 1  Deutsche Bank 0 
Banque Indosuez 0  Charles Stanley 0  Deutsche Bank AG (London) 0 
Banque Nationale de 
Paris{BNP} 
0  Charles Stanley Securities 0  Deutsche Morgan Grenfell 0 
Barclays 0  Charterhouse Bank Ltd 0  DnB Markets AS 0 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd Ltd 0  Charterhouse Japhet PLC 0  DnB NOR BANK ASA 0 
Barclays PLC 0  Charterhouse Securities Ltd 0  Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette 0 
Barclays/BZW European 
Business 
0  Charterhouse Tilney 0  Dow Schofield Watts LLP 1 
Baring Brothers & Co Ltd 0  Chase H&Q 0  Dresdner Kleinwort 0 
Baring Brothers International 0  Chase Manhattan Bank NA 0  Dresdner Kleinwort Benson 0 
Baring Brothers Ltd 0  Chase Manhattan Bank PLC 0  Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein 
0 
Barings BV 0  Chase Manhattan Corp 0  Durlacher & Co 0 
BBVA 0  Chemical Banking Corp 0  E Ohman Jr Fondkommission 0 
BDO Stoy Hayward 0  Cie Financiere Edmond Roth 1  EEIP 1 
EFG Hellas PLC 0  HSBC Holdings PLC 0  Lazard Freres & Co LLC 1 
EFG Telesis Finance 0  HSBC Investment Bank Asia 
Ltd 
0  Lazard Freres et Cie 1 
English Trust Co Ltd 1  HSBC Investment Bank PLC 0  Lazard Houses 1 
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Enskilda Securities, Inc 0  HSBC Investment Banking Ltd 0  Lehman Brothers 0 
EnVent SpA 1  HSBC James Capel & Co 0  Lehman Brothers 
International 
0 
equinet AG 0  Huebner Schloesser & Cie 1  Lenner & Partners 1 
EquityGate 1  HVB Consult GmbH 0  Leonardo & Co 1 
Erneholm & Haskel AB 1  IBI Corporate Finance 1  Lexicon Partners 1 
Ernst & Young (UK) 0  IMI Bank Intl 0  Liberum Capital 1 
Ernst & Young Corp Finance 0  IMI Securities 0  Lincoln International 1 
Ernst & Young LLP 0  ING 0  Lombard Odier & Cie 0 
Erste Group 0  ING Barings 0  Lombard Odier International 
SA 
0 
Euroland Finance 0  ING Groep NV 0  LongAcre Partners 1 
Evercore Partners 1  Intelli Corporate Finance Ltd 1  M Klein & Co LLC 1 
Evli Bank Plc 0  Intermonte Securities (SIM) 0  Macquarie Bank 0 
Evolution Securities Ltd 1  Invercaixa Valores SV 0  Macquarie Capital Partners 
LLC 
0 
FBM Mahler 1  Invest Securities 0  Mandatum & Co 1 
Fearnley Fonds A/S 0  Investec 0  MCC 0 
finnCap Ltd 0  Investec Bank (UK) Ltd 0  McQueen Ltd 1 
First Securities AS 0  Investec Bank Ltd 0  Mediobanca 0 
First Securities Co Ltd 1  Investec Capital Alliance 0  Mediobanca SpA 0 
Fiske & Co 0  Investec Group Ltd 0  Mees & Hope Corporate 
Finance 
0 
Fleet Boston Corp 0  Investec Henderson Crosthwaite 0  MeesPierson NV 0 
Flemings 0  Investec Investment Banking 0  Merrill Lynch 0 
Fondsfinans AS 0  Investec PLC 0  Merrill Lynch Bank AG 0 
Fortis 0  J Henry Schroder & Co Ltd 0  Merrill Lynch Intl Ltd 0 
Fortis Finance 0  J Henry Schroder Wagg & Co 
Ltd 
0  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 0 
FOX DAVIES CAPITAL 1  Jaakko Poyry Oy 0  Messier Partners LLC 1 
Fox-Pitt Kelton 1  James Capel & Co. 0  Michel Dyens 1 
Georgieff Capital Advisors 1  Jefferies & Co Inc 0  Millennium BCP SA 0 
Gleacher & Co LLC 1  Jefferies International Ltd 0  Moelis & Co 1 
Gleacher Shacklock LLP 1  JM Finn & Co 1  Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd 0 
Goldman Sachs & Co 0  JO Hambro Magan & Co Ltd 0  Morgan Stanley 0 
Goldman Sachs International 0  JP Morgan 0  Morgan Stanley & Co 0 
Goodbody Stockbrokers 1  JP Morgan Cazenove 0  N+1 1 
Grant Thornton 0  JP Morgan Italia 0  N+1 Brewin 1 
Granville 1  JP Morgan Securities Inc 0  Nabarro Wells & Co Ltd 1 
Granville & Co 1  Kaupthing Bank HF 0  Natixis 0 
Greenhill & Co, LLC 1  KBC Peel Hunt Ltd 0  NatWest Markets 0 
Gruppo Banca Leonardo 0  KBC Securities 0  NCB Corporate Finance 
Ireland 
0 
Gudme Raaschou Securities 0  Kempen and Co NV 0  Neilson Cobbold Ltd 0 
Hambros Bank Ltd 0  Kinmont Ltd 1  Network Corporate Finance 1 
Handelsbanken Capital Markets 0  Kleinwort Benson Ltd 0  NIB Capital NV 0 
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Hawkpoint Partners 1  KPMG 0  NIBC Bank NV 0 
Henry Ansbacher Holding PLC 0  KPMG Asesores SL 0  NIBC NV 0 
Henry Cooke Corporate 
Finance 
0  KPMG Corporate Finance 0  NM Rothschild & Sons 
Limited 
1 
Hill Samuel & Co Ltd 0  Lambert Energy Advisory Ltd 1  NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd 1 
Hoare Govett Ltd 0  Lansdowne Capital Ltd 1  Nmas1 1 
Houlihan Lokey 1  Lazard 1  Noble & Co Ltd 1 
HQ Bank AB 0  Lazard Brothers & Co Ltd 1  Noble Grossart 1 
Nomura Code Securities Ltd 0  Rothschild Italia SpA 1  UBS Warburg 0 
Nomura International PLC 0  RS Platou Securities AS 0  UBS Warburg (UK) 0 
Nomura Securities 0  Ruegg & Co Ltd 1  UBS-Phillips & Drew Sec Ltd 0 
Nordea Bank Sverige AB 0  Sal Oppenheim 1  UniCredit 0 
Nordea Corporate Finance 0  Sal Oppenheim Jr & Cie (SW) 1  Unicredit Banca Mobiliare 
SpA 
0 
Nordea PLC 0  Salomon Brothers 0  UniCredit Group 0 
Nordea Securities 0  Salomon Smith Barney 0  Union Bank of Switzerland 0 
Norden Investment Banking 1  Samuel Montagu & Co Ltd 0  Unipol Banca 0 
NORDFIRST 1  Santander 0  Warburg Dillon Read Inc 0 
Numis 0  Santander Central Hispano 0  Wasserstein Perella Group Inc 1 
Numis Securities Ltd 0  Santander Central Hispano Inv. 0  Wertheim Schroder 0 
Oakley Capital Investments 1  SBC Warburg 0  West Merchant Bank Ltd 0 
Oddo Corporate Finance 0  SBC Warburg Dillon Read Inc 0  Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Giro 
0 
Old Mutual Int'n Asset Mgrs 0  Schroder Salomon Smith Barney 0  Westhouse Securities LLP 1 
Olliff & Partners Plc 1  Schroders 0  WestLB (UK) 0 
Ondra Partners 1  Scrimgeour Vickers & Co 0  WestLB AG 0 
Oriel Securities Limited 0  SDM Corporate Finance Group 
NV 
1  WestLB Panmure Ltd 0 
Panmure Gordon & Co Ltd 0  SEB 0  WH Ireland Ltd 1 
Pareto Securities 0  Seymour Pierce 1  Williams de Broe PLC 1 
Paribas SA 0  Seymour Pierce Butterfield 1  Wise Speke Ltd 0 
PCA Corporate Finance Oy 1  Seymour Pierce Ltd 1  Vitale Borghesi & Co SpA 1 
Peel Hunt & Co Ltd 0  SG Hambros Corporate Finance 0  Wood & Co 0 
Peel Hunt LLP 0  SG Warburg & Co Inc (SZ) 0  Wood & Co Inc 0 
Perella Weinberg Partners LP 1  SG Warburg Group PLC 0  Woori Invest & Sec Co Ltd 0 
Petercam Securities SA 0  Sheppards 0  Zeus Capital Ltd 1 
Peters Associates AG 1  Shore Capital Group 1    
Phoenix Securities Ltd 1  Sin&rgetica Srl 1    
Pierson Heldring & Pierson NV 0  Singer & Friedlander Group 
PLC 
0    
Piper Jaffray Cos 0  Singer Capital Markets Ltd 1    
Poli e Associati SpA 1  Smith New Court PLC 1    
Price Waterhouse 0  Societe Generale 0    
PricewaterhouseCoopers 0  Sprott Securities Ltd 1    
Quilter & Co. Ltd 0  Strand Partners Ltd 1    
Rabobank NV 0  Strata Partners 1    
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Rathbone Neilson Cobbold Ltd 0  Summa Capital Oy 1    
RBC Capital Markets 0  Sun Capital Partners Ltd 1    
RBS 0  Sundal Collier & Co AS 0    
RBS Hoare Govett Ltd 0  Swedbank Markets 0    
Regent Associates 1  Swiss Bank Corp 0    
Ricol Lasteyrie & Associes SA 1  Tamburi Investment Partners Sp 1    
Robert Fleming & Co Ltd (UK) 0  Teather & Greenwood Ltd 1    
Robert Fleming Holdings PLC 0  Toft Advice ApS 1    
Robert Fleming Inc 0  Tricorn Partners LLP 1    
Robert W Baird & Co Inc 0  Trillium Partners Ltd 1    
Roberto de Guardiola Co LLC 1  UBS 0    
Rothschild 1  UBS AG 0    
Rothschild & Cie Banque 1  UBS Investment Bank 0    
Rothschild et Compagnie 1  UBS Ltd 0    
Rothschild Group 1  UBS Ltd/Union Bank 
Switzerland 
0    
Rothschild Inc. 1  UBS Phillips & Drew Capital 0    
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Appendix 3a - Hypothesis framework and evidence (skill hypothesis) 
Skill hypothesis 
Advisor choice Deal outcome 
Hostile  Premium Competition Stock Cross Industry Cross Border Duration Completion 
Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
and target 
Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
and target 
Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
Boutique or mixed 
chosen for acquirer 
Acquirer uses 
boutique or mixed 
Target uses boutique 
or mixed 
Acquirer Target. Acquirer Acquirer Target Acquirer. Acquirer. Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique 
Acquirer uses 
boutique mixed 
Target uses boutique 
or mixed 
Acquirer uses 
boutique or mixed 
Target uses boutique 
or mixed 
Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique 
Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Mixed Boutique Boutique 
Boutique 
Significant evidence found in 
support of hypothesis 
No significant evidence found in 
support of hypothesis 
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Appendix 3b - Hypothesis framework and evidence (scale hypothesis) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale hypothesis 
Deal Size 
No implications Full-service chosen for larger deals 
Advisor choice Deal outcome 
Significant evidence found 
